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Abstract— Evidence indicates that downloading on-demandAQ:1 1
videos accounts for a dramatic increase in data traffic over2
cellular networks. Caching popular videos in the storage of small-3
cell base stations (SBS), namely, small-cell caching, is an efficient4
technology for reducing the transmission latency while mitigating5
the redundant transmissions of popular videos over back-haul6
channels. In this paper, we consider a commercialized small-cell7
caching system consisting of a network service provider (NSP),8
several video retailers (VRs), and mobile users (MUs). The9
NSP leases its SBSs to the VRs for the purpose of making10
profits, and the VRs, after storing popular videos in the rented11
SBSs, can provide faster local video transmissions to the MUs,12
thereby gaining more profits. We conceive this system within the13
framework of Stackelberg game by treating the SBSs as specific14
types of resources. We first model the MUs and SBSs as two15
independent Poisson point processes, and develop, via stochastic16
geometry theory, the probability of the specific event that an17
MU obtains the video of its choice directly from the memory of18
an SBS. Then, based on the probability derived, we formulate a19
Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the average profit of both20
the NSP and the VRs. In addition, we investigate the Stackelberg21
equilibrium by solving a non-convex optimization problem. With22
the aid of this game theoretic framework, we shed light on23
the relationship between four important factors: the optimal24
pricing of leasing an SBS, the SBSs allocation among the VRs,25
the storage size of the SBSs, and the popularity distribution26
of the VRs. Monte Carlo simulations show that our stochastic27
geometry-based analytical results closely match the empirical28
ones. Numerical results are also provided for quantifying the29
proposed game-theoretic framework by showing its efficiency on30
pricing and resource allocation.
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I. INTRODUCTION 34
W IRELESS data traffic is expected to increase exponen- 35tially in the next few years driven by a staggering 36
proliferation of mobile users (MU) and their bandwidth- 37
hungry mobile applications. There is evidence that streaming 38
of on-demand videos by the MUs is the major reason for 39
boosting the tele-traffic over cellular networks [1]. According 40
to the prediction of mobile data traffic by Cisco, mobile video 41
streaming will account for 72% of the overall mobile data 42
traffic by 2019. The on-demand video downloading involves 43
repeated wireless transmission of videos that are requested 44
multiple times by different users in a completely asynchronous 45
manner, which is different from the transmission style of live 46
video streaming. 47
Often, there are numerous repetitive requests of popular 48
videos from the MUs, such as online blockbusters, leading 49
to redundant video transmissions. The redundancy of data 50
transmissions can be reduced by locally storing popular videos, 51
known as caching, into the storage of intermediate network 52
nodes, effectively forming a local caching system [1], [2]. 53
The local caching brings video content closer to the MUs 54
and alleviates redundant data transmissions via redirecting the 55
downloading requests to the intermediate nodes. 56
Generally, wireless data caching consists of two stages: 57
data placement and data delivery [3]. In the data placement 58
stage, popular videos are cached into local storages during 59
off-peak periods, while during the data delivery stage, videos 60
requested are delivered from the local caching system to 61
the MUs. Recent works advanced the caching solutions of 62
both device-to-device (D2D) networks and wireless sensor 63
networks [4]–[6]. Specifically, in [4] a caching scheme was 64
proposed for a D2D based cellular network relaying on 65
the MUs’ caching of popular video content. In this scheme, the 66
D2D cluster size was optimized for reducing the downloading 67
delay. In [5] and [6], the authors proposed novel caching 68
schemes for wireless sensor networks, where the protocol 69
model of [7] was adopted. 70
Since small-cell embedded architectures will dominate 71
in future cellular networks, known as heterogeneous net- 72
works (HetNet) [8]–[13], caching relying on small-cell base 73
stations (SBS), namely, small-cell caching, constitutes a 74
promising solution for HetNets. The advantages brought about 75
by small-cell caching are threefold. Firstly, popular videos are 76
placed closer to the MUs when they are cached in SBSs, hence 77
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reducing the transmission latency. Secondly, redundant trans-78
missions over SBSs’ back-haul channels, which are usually79
expensive [14], can be mitigated. Thirdly, the majority of video80
traffic is offloaded from macro-cell base stations to SBSs.81
In [15], a small-cell caching scheme, named82
‘Femtocaching’, is proposed for a cellular network having83
embedded SBSs, where the data placement at the SBSs is84
optimized in a centralized manner for the sake of reducing85
the transmission delay imposed. However, [15] considers an86
idealized system, where neither the interference nor the impact87
of wireless channels is taken into account. The associations88
between the MUs and the SBSs are pre-determined without89
considering the specific channel conditions encountered.90
In [16], small-cell caching is investigated in the context of91
stochastic networks. The average performance is quantified92
with the aid of stochastic geometry [17], [18], where the93
distribution of network nodes is modeled by Poisson point94
process (PPP). However, the caching strategy of [16] assumes95
that the SBSs cache the same content, hence leading to a96
sub-optimal solution.97
As detailed above, current research on wireless caching98
mainly considers the data placement issue optimized for reduc-99
ing the downloading delay. However, the entire caching system100
design involves numerous issues apart from data placement.101
From a commercial perspective, it will be more interesting102
to consider the topics of pricing for video streaming, the103
rental of local storage, and so on. A commercialized caching104
system may consist of video retailers (VR), network service105
providers (NSP) and MUs. The VRs, e.g., Youtube, purchase106
copyrights from video producers and publish the videos on107
their web-sites. The NSPs are typically operators of cellular108
networks, who are in charge of network facilities, such as109
macro-cell base stations and SBSs.110
In such a commercial small-cell caching system, the VRs’111
revenue is acquired from providing video streaming for112
the MUs. As the central servers of the VRs, which store113
the popular videos, are usually located in the backbone net-114
works and far away from the MUs, an efficient solution is115
to locally cache these videos, thereby gaining more profits116
from providing faster local transmissions. In turn, these local117
caching demands raised by the VRs offer the NSPs prof-118
itable opportunities from leasing their SBSs. Additionally, the119
NSPs can save considerable costs due to reduced redundant120
video transmissions over SBSs’ back-haul channels. In this121
sense, both the VRs and NSPs are the beneficiaries of the122
local caching system. However, each entity is selfish and123
wishes to maximize its own benefit, raising a competition124
and optimization problem among these entities, which can be125
effectively solved within the framework of game theory.126
We note that game theory has been successfully applied127
to wireless communications for solving resource allocation128
problems. In [19], the authors propose a dynamic spectrum129
leasing mechanism via power control games. In [20],130
a price-based power allocation scheme is proposed for spec-131
trum sharing in Femto-cell networks based on Stackelberg132
game. Game theoretical power control strategies for maxi-133
mizing the utility in spectrum sharing networks are studied134
in [21] and [22].135
In this paper, we propose a commercial small-cell caching 136
system consisting of an NSP, multiple VRs and MUs. We opti- 137
mize such a system within the framework of Stackelberg game 138
by viewing the SBSs as a specific type of resources for the 139
purpose of video caching. Generally speaking, Stackelberg 140
game is a strategic game that consists of a leader and several 141
followers competing with each other for certain resources [23]. 142
The leader moves first and the followers move subsequently. 143
Correspondingly, in our game theoretic caching system, we 144
consider the NSP to be the leader and the VRs as the followers. 145
The NSP sets the price of leasing an SBS, while the VRs 146
compete with each other for renting a fraction of the SBSs. 147
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, our work is the first 148
of its kind that optimizes a caching system with the aid of 149
game theory. Compared to many other game theory based 150
resource allocation schemes, where the power, bandwidth 151
and time slots are treated as the resources, our work has 152
a totally different profit model, established based on our 153
coverage derivations. In particular, our contributions are as 154
follows. 155
1) By following the stochastic geometry framework 156
of [17] and [18], we model the MUs and SBSs in 157
the network as two different ties of a Poisson point 158
process (PPP) [24]. Under this network model, we define 159
the concept of a successful video downloading event 160
when an MU obtains the requested video directly from 161
the storage of an SBS. Then we quantify the probability 162
of this event based on stochastic geometry theory. 163
2) Based on the probability derived, we develop a profit 164
model of our caching system and formulate the profits 165
gained by the NSP and the VRs from SBSs leasing and 166
renting. 167
3) A Stackelberg game is proposed for jointly maximizing 168
the average profit of the NSP and the VRs. Given this 169
game theoretic framework, we investigate a non-uniform 170
pricing scheme, where the price charged to different VRs 171
varies. 172
4) Then we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium of this 173
scheme via solving a non-convex optimization problem. 174
It is interesting to observe that the optimal solution is 175
related both to the storage size of each SBS and to the 176
popularity distribution of the VRs. 177
5) Furthermore, we consider an uniform pricing scheme. 178
We find that although the uniform pricing scheme is 179
inferior to the non-uniform one in terms of maximizing 180
the NSP’s profit, it is capable of reducing more back- 181
haul costs compared with the latter and achieves the 182
maximum sum profit of the NSP and the VRs. 183
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe 184
the system model in Section II and establish the related profit 185
model in Section III. We then formulate Stackelberg game for 186
our small-cell caching system in Section IV. In Section V, 187
we investigate Stackelberg equilibrium for the non-uniform 188
pricing scheme by solving a non-convex optimization prob- 189
lem, while in Section VI, we further consider the uniform 190
pricing scheme. Our simulations and numerical results are 191
detailed in Section VII, while our conclusions are provided 192
in Section VIII. 193
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Fig. 1. An example of the small-cell caching system with four VRs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL194
We consider a commercial small-cell caching system con-
AQ:3
195
sisting of an NSP, V VRs, and a number of MUs. Let us196
denote by L the NSP, by V = {V1, V2, · · · , VV } the set of the197
VRs, and by M one of the MUs. Fig. 1 shows an example of198
our caching system relying on four VRs. In such a system, the199
VRs wish to rent the SBSs from L for placing their videos.200
Both the NSP and each VR aim for maximizing their profits.201
There are three stages in our system. In the first stage, the202
VRs purchase the copyrights of popular videos from video203
producers and publish them on their web-sites. In the second204
stage, the VRs negotiate with the NSP on the rent of SBSs205
for caching these popular videos. In the third stage, the MUs206
connect to the SBSs for downloading the desired videos.207
We will particulary focus our attention on the second and third208
stages within this game theoretic framework.209
A. Network Model210
Let us consider a small-cell based caching network com-211
posed of the MUs and the SBSs owned by L, where each212
SBS is deployed with a fixed transmit power P and the storage213
of Q video files. Let us assume that the SBSs transmit over214
the channels that are orthogonal to those of the macro-cell215
base stations, and thus there is no interference incurred by the216
macro-cell base stations. Also, assume that these SBSs are217
spatially distributed according to a homogeneous PPP (HPPP)218
 of intensity λ. Here, the intensity λ represents the number of219
the SBSs per unit area. Furthermore, we model the distribution220
of the MUs as an independent HPPP  of intensity ζ .221
The wireless down-link channels spanning from the SBSs222
to the MUs are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.),223
and modeled as the combination of path-loss and Rayleigh224
fading. Without loss of generality, we carry out our analysis225
for a typical MU located at the origin. The path-loss between226
an SBS located at x and the typical MU is denoted by ‖x‖−α ,227
where α is the path-loss exponent. The channel power of228
the Rayleigh fading between them is denoted by hx , where229
hx ∼ exp(1). The noise at an MU is Gaussian distributed230
with a variance σ 2.231
We consider the steady-state of a saturated network, where232
all the SBSs keep on transmitting data in the entire frequency233
band allocated. This modeling approach for saturated networks234
characterizes the worst-case scenario of the real systems,235
which has been adopted by numerous studies on PPP analysis,236
such as [18]. Hence, the received signal-to-interference-plus- 237
noise ratio (SINR) at the typical MU from an SBS located at 238
x can be expressed as 239
ρ(x) = Phx‖x‖
−α
∑
x ′∈\x Phx ′ ‖x ′‖−α + σ 2
. (1) 240
The typical MU is considered to be “covered” by an 241
SBS located at x as long as ρ(x) is no lower than a pre-set 242
SINR threshold δ, i.e., 243
ρ(x) ≥ δ. (2) 244
Generally, an MU can be covered by multiple SBSs. Note that 245
the SINR threshold δ defines the highest delay of downloading 246
a video file. Since the quality and code rate of a video clip 247
have been specified within the video file, the download delay 248
will be the major factor predetermining the QoS perceived by 249
the mobile users. Therefore, we focus our attention on the 250
coverage and SINR in the following derivations. 251
B. Popularity and Preferences 252
We now model the popularity distribution, i.e., the distri- 253
bution of request probabilities, among the popular videos to 254
be cached. Let us denote by F = {F1, F2, · · · , FN } the file 255
set consisting of N video files, where each video file contains 256
an individual movie or video clip that is frequently requested 257
by MUs. The popularity distribution of F is represented by a 258
vector t = [t1, t2, · · · , tN ]. That is, the MUs make independent 259
requests of the n-th video Fn , n = 1, · · · , N , with the 260
probability of tn . Generally, t can be modeled by the Zipf 261
distribution [25] as 262
tn = 1/n
β
∑N
j=1 1/jβ
, ∀n, (3) 263
where the exponent β is a positive value, characterizing the 264
video popularity. A higher β corresponds to a higher content 265
reuse, where the most popular files account for the majority 266
of download requests. From Eq. (3), the file with a smaller n 267
corresponds to a higher popularity. 268
Note that each SBS can cache at most Q video files, and 269
usually Q is no higher than the number of videos in F , i.e., 270
we have Q ≤ N . Without loss of generality, we assume that 271
N/Q is an integer. The N files in F are divided into F = N/Q 272
file groups (FG), with each FG containing Q video files. The 273
n-th video, ∀n ∈ {( f − 1)Q + 1, · · · , f Q}, is included in the 274
f -th FG, f = 1, · · · , F . Denote by G f the f -th FG, and by 275
p f the probability of the MUs’ requesting a file in G f , and 276
we have 277
p f =
f Q∑
n=( f −1)Q+1
tn, ∀ f. (4) 278
File caching is then carried out on the basis of FGs, where 279
each SBS caches one of the F FGs. 280
At the same time, the MUs have unbalanced preferences 281
with regard to the V VRs, i.e., some VRs are more popular 282
than others. For example, the majority of the MUs may tend 283
to access Youtube for video streaming. The preference distri- 284
bution among the VRs is denoted by q = [q1, q2, · · · , qV ], 285
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where qv , v = 1, · · · , V , represents the probability that the286
MUs prefer to download videos from Vv . The preference287
distribution q can also be modeled by the Zipf distribution.288
Hence, we have289
qv = 1/v
γ
∑V
j=1 1/jγ
, ∀v, (5)290
where γ is a positive value, characterizing the preference of291
the VRs. A higher γ corresponds to a higher probability of292
accessing the most popular VRs.293
C. Video Placement and Download294
Next, we introduce the small-cell caching system with its295
detailed parameters. In the first stage, each VR purchases the296
N popular videos in F from the producers and publishes these297
videos on its web-site. In the second stage, upon obtaining298
these videos, the VRs negotiate with the NSP L for renting299
its SBSs. As L leases its SBSs to multiple VRs, we denote by300
τ = [τ1, τ2, · · · , τV ] the fraction vector, where τv represents301
the fraction of the SBSs that are assigned to Vv , ∀v. We assume302
that the SBSs rented by each VR are uniformly distributed.303
Hence, the SBSs that are allocated to Vv can be modeled as304
a “thinned” HPPP v with intensity τvλ.305
The data placements of the second stage commence during306
network off-peak time after the VRs obtain access to the SBSs.307
During the placements, each SBS will be allocated with one of308
the F FGs. Generally, we assume that the VRs do not have the309
a priori information regarding the popularity distribution of F .310
This is because the popularity of videos is changing periodi-311
cally, and can only be obtained statistically after these videos312
quit the market. It is clear that each VR may have more or313
less some statistical information on the popularity distribution314
of videos based on the MUs’ downloading history. However,315
this information will be biased due to limited sampling. In this316
case, the VRs will uniformly assign the F FGs to the SBSs317
with equal probability of 1F for simplicity. We are interested in318
investigating the uniform assignment of video files for drawing319
a bottom line of the system performance. As the FGs are320
randomly assigned, the SBSs in v that cache the FG G f can321
be further modeled as a “more thinned” HPPP v, f with an322
intensity of 1F τvλ.323
In the third stage, the MUs start to download videos. When324
an MU M requires a video of G f from Vv , it searches the SBSs325
in v, f and tries to connect to the nearest SBS that covers M .326
Provided that such an SBS exists, the MU M will obtain this327
video directly from this SBS, and we thereby define this event328
by Ev, f . By contrast, if such an SBS does not exist, M will329
be redirected to the central servers of Vv for downloading330
the requested file. Since the servers of Vv are located at the331
backbone network, this redirection of the demand will trigger332
a transmission via the back-haul channels of the NSP L, hence333
leading to an extra cost.334
III. PROFIT MODELING335
We now focus on modeling the profit of the NSP and336
the VRs obtained from the small-cell caching system. The337
average profit is developed based on stochastically geometrical338
distributions of the network nodes in terms of per unit area 339
times unit period (/U AP), e.g., /month · km2. 340
A. Average Profit of the NSP 341
For the NSP L, the revenue gained from the caching system 342
consists of two parts: 1) the income gleaned from leasing SBSs 343
to the VRs and 2) the cost reduction due to reduced usage of 344
the SBSs’ back-haul channels. First, the leasing income/U AP 345
of L can be calculated as 346
SRT =
V∑
j=1
τ jλs j , (6) 347
where s j is the price per unit period charged to V j for 348
renting an SBS. Then we formulate the saved cost/U AP 349
due to reduced back-haul channel transmissions. When an 350
MU demands a video in G f from Vv , we derive the probability 351
Pr(Ev, f ) as follows. 352
Theorem 1: The probability of the event Ev, f , ∀v, f , can 353
be expressed as 354
Pr(Ev, f ) = τvC(δ, α)(F − τv) + A(δ, α)τv + τv , (7) 355
where we have A(δ, α)  2δα−2 2 F1
(
1, 1 − 2α ; 2 − 2α ; −δ
)
356
and C(δ, α)  2α δ
2
α B
( 2
α , 1 − 2α
)
. Furthermore, 2 F1(·) in 357
the function A(δ, α) is the hypergeometric function, while 358
the Beta function in C(δ, α) is formulated as B(x, y) = 359∫ 1
0 t
x−1(1 − t)y−1dt . 360
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.  361
Remark 1: From Theorem 1, it is interesting to observe that 362
the probability Pr(Ev, f ) is independent of both the transmit 363
power P and the intensity λ of the SBSs. Furthermore, since 364
Q is inversely proportional to F , we can enhance Pr(Ev, f ) by 365
increasing the storage size Q. 366
We assume that there are on average K video requests from 367
each MU within unit period, and that the average back-haul 368
cost for a video transmission is sbh . Based on Pr(Ev, f ) in 369
Eq. (7), we obtain the cost reduction/U AP for the back-haul 370
channels of L as 371
SB H =
F∑
j1=1
V∑
j2=1
p j1q j2ζ K Pr(E j2, j1)s
bh . (8) 372
By combining the above two items, the overall profit/U AP 373
for L can be expressed as 374
SN S P = SRT + SB H . (9) 375
B. Average Profit of the VRs 376
Note that the MUs can download the videos either from the 377
memories of the SBSs directly or from the servers of the VRs 378
at backbone networks via back-haul channels. In the first case, 379
the MUs will be levied by the VRs an extra amount of money 380
in addition to the videos’ prices because of the higher-rate 381
local streaming, namely, local downloading surcharge (LDS). 382
We assume that the LDS of each video is set as sld . Then the 383
revenue/U AP for a VR Vv gained from the LDS can be 384
calculated as 385
SL Dv =
F∑
j=1
p j qvζ K Pr(Ev, j )sld . (10) 386
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Additionally, Vv pays for renting the SBSs from L. The related387
cost/U AP can be written as388
SRTv = τvλsv . (11)389
Upon combining the two items, the profit/U AP for Vv , ∀v,390
can be expressed as391
SV Rv = SL Dv − SRTv . (12)392
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION393
In this section, we first present the Stackelberg game for-394
mulation for our price-based SBS allocation scheme. Then the395
equilibrium of the proposed game is investigated.396
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation397
Again, Stackelberg game is a strategic game that consists of398
a leader and several followers competing with each other for399
certain resources [23]. The leader moves first and the followers400
move subsequently. In our small-cell caching system, we401
model the NSP L as the leader, and the V VRs as the followers.402
The NSP imposes a price vector s = [s1, s2, · · · , sV ] for403
the lease of its SBSs, where sv , ∀v, has been defined in the404
previous section as the price per unit period charged on Vv405
for renting an SBS. After the price vector s is set, the VRs406
update the fraction τv , ∀v, that they tend to rent from L.407
1) Optimization Formulation of the Leader: Observe from408
the above game model that the NSP’s objective is to maximize409
its profit SN S P formulated in Eq. (9). Note that for ∀v, the410
fraction τv is a function of the price sv under the Stackelberg411
game formulation. This means that the fraction of the SBSs412
that each VR is willing to rent depends on the specific price413
charged to them for renting an SBS. Consequently, the NSP414
has to find the optimal price vector s for maximizing its profit.415
This optimization problem can be summarized as follows.416
Problem 1: The optimization problem of maximizing L’s417
profit can be formulated as418
max
s	0 S
N S P (s, τ ),419
s.t.
V∑
j=1
τ j ≤ 1. (13)420
2) Optimization Formulation of the Followers: The profit421
gained by the VR Vv in Eq. (12) can be further written as422
SV Rv (τv , sv ) =
F∑
j=1
p j qvζ K Pr(Ev, j )sld − τvλsv423
=
F∑
j=1
p j qvζ K sldτv
(A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1)τv + C(δ, α)F424
−λsv τv . (14)425
We can see from Eq. (14) that once the price sv is fixed, the426
profit of Vv depends on τv , i.e., the fraction of SBSs that427
are rented by Vv . If Vv increases the fraction τv , it will gain428
more revenue by levying surcharges from more MUs, while429
at the same time, Vv will have to pay for renting more SBSs.430
Therefore, τv has to be optimized for maximizing the profit 431
of Vv . This optimization can be formulated as follows. 432
Problem 2: The optimization problem of maximizing Vv ’s 433
profit can be written as 434
max
τv≥0
SV Rv (τv , sv ). (15) 435
Problem 1 and Problem 2 together form a Stackelberg 436
game. The objective of this game is to find the Stackelberg 437
Equilibrium (SE) points from which neither the leader (NSP) 438
nor the followers (VRs) have incentives to deviate. In the 439
following, we investigate the SE points for the proposed game. 440
B. Stackelberg Equilibrium 441
For our Stackelberg game, the SE is defined as follows. 442
Definition 1: Let s  [s1, s2, · · · , sV ] be a solution for 443
Problem 1, and τ v be a solution for Problem 2, ∀v. Define 444
τ   [τ 1 , τ 2 , · · · , τ V ]. Then the point (s, τ ) is an SE for 445
the proposed Stackelberg game if for any (s, τ ) with s 	 0 446
and τ 	 0, the following conditions are satisfied: 447
SN S P (s, τ ) ≥ SN S P (s, τ ), 448
SV Rv (sv , τ v ) ≥ SV Rv (sv , τv ), ∀v. (16) 449
Generally speaking, the SE of a Stackelberg game can be 450
obtained by finding its perfect Nash Equilibrium (NE). In our 451
proposed game, we can see that the VRs strictly compete 452
in a non-cooperative fashion. Therefore, a non-cooperative 453
subgame on controlling the fractions of rented SBSs is for- 454
mulated at the VRs’ side. For a non-cooperative game, the 455
NE is defined as the operating points at which no players can 456
improve utility by changing its strategy unilaterally. At the 457
NSP’s side, since there is only one player, the best response 458
of the NSP is to solve Problem 1. To achieve this, we need to 459
first find the best response functions of the followers, based 460
on which, we solve the best response function for the leader. 461
Therefore, in our game, we first solve Problem 2 given a 462
price vector s. Then with the obtained best response function 463
τ  of the VRs, we solve Problem 1 for the optimal price s. In 464
the following, we will have an in-depth investigation on this 465
game theoretic optimization. 466
V. GAME THEORETIC OPTIMIZATION 467
In this section, we will solve the optimization problem in 468
our game under the non-uniform pricing scheme, where the 469
NSP L charges the VRs with different prices s1, · · · , sV for 470
renting an SBS. In this scheme, we first solve Problem 2 at 471
the VRs, and rewrite Eq. (14) as 472
SV Rv (τv , sv ) =
vs
ldτv
τv +  − λsv τv .0 (17) 473
where v 
∑F
j=1 p j qvζ K ,   A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1, and 474
  C(δ, α)F . We observe that Eq. (17) is a concave function 475
over the variable τv . Thus, we can obtain the optimal solution 476
by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and we 477
have the following lemma. 478
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Lemma 1: For a given price sv , the optimal solution of479
Problem 2 is480
τ v =
⎛
⎝
√
vsld
2λ
√
1
sv
− 

⎞
⎠
+
, (18)481
where (·)+  max(·, 0).482
Proof: The optimal solution τ v of Vv can be obtained by483
deriving SV Rv with respect to τv and solving
dSV Rv
dτv = 0 under484
the constraint that τv ≥ 0. 485
We can see from Lemma 1 that if the price sv is set too486
high, i.e., sv ≥ v sldλ , the VR Vv will opt out for renting any487
SBS from L due the high price charged. Consequently, the488
VR Vv will not participate in the game.489
In the following derivations, we assume that the LDS on490
each video sld is set by the VRs to be the cost of a video trans-491
mission via back-haul channels sbh . The rational behind this492
assumption is as follows. Since a local downloading reduce a493
back-haul transmission, this saved back-haul transmission can494
be potentially utilized to provide extra services (equivalent to495
the value of sbh ) for the MUs. In addition, the MUs enjoy the496
benefit from faster local video transmissions. In light of this,497
it is reasonable to assume that the MUs are willing to accept498
the price sbh for a local video transmission.499
Substituting the optimal τ v of Eq. (18) into Eq. (9) and500
carry out some further manipulations, we arrive at501
SN S P =
V∑
j=1
λs j
⎛
⎝
√
 j sbh
2λ
√
1
s j
− 

⎞
⎠
+
502
+
∑F
i=1 pi q jζ K sbh
(√
 jsbh
2λ
√
1
s j − 
)+

(√
 jsbh
2λ
√
1
s j − 
)+
+ 
503
=
V∑
j=1
ξi

(
−λs j +
(√
sbh − s
bh
√
sbh
)
√
 jλs j +  j sbh
)
504
=
V∑
j=1
ξi

(
−λs j +  j sbh
)
, (19)505
where ξ j is the indicator function, with ξ j = 1 if s j <  j s
bh
λ506
and ξ j = 0 otherwise. Upon defining the binary vector ξ 507
[ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξV ], we can rewrite Problem 1 as follows.508
Problem 3: Given the optimal solutions τ v , ∀v, gleaned509
from the followers, we can rewrite Problem 1 as510
min
ξ , s	0
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(
λs j −  j sbh
)
,511
s.t.
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
 j sbh
λs j
− 
)
≤ . (20)512
Observe from Eq. (20) that Problem 3 is non-convex due513
to ξ . However, for a given ξ , this problem can be solved by514
satisfying the KKT conditions. In the following, we commence515
with the assumption that ξ = 1, i.e., ξv = 1, ∀v, and then we516
extend this result to the general case.517
A. Special Case: ξv = 1, ∀v 518
In this case, all the VRs are participating in the game, and 519
we have the following optimization problem. 520
Problem 4: Assuming ξv = 1, ∀v, we rewrite Problem 3 as 521
min
s	0
V∑
j=1
s j , 522
s.t.
V∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ (V + )
√
λ
sbh
. (21) 523
The optimal solution of Problem 4 is derived and given in 524
the following lemma. 525
Lemma 2: The optimal solution to Problem 4 can be 526
derived as sˆ  [sˆ1, · · · , sˆV ], where 527
sˆv =
sbh
(∑V
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ(V  + )2 , ∀v. (22) 528
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.  529
Note that the solution given in Lemma 2 is found under 530
the assumption that ξv = 1, ∀v. That is, sˆv given in Eq. (22) 531
should ensure that τ v > 0, ∀v, in Eq. (18), i.e., 532
sbh
(∑V
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ(V  + )2 <
vs
bh
λ
. (23) 533
Given the definitions of v , , and , it is interesting to find 534
that the inequality (23) can be finally converted to a constraint 535
on the storage size Q of each SBS, which is formulated as 536
Q > max
⎧
⎨
⎩
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qv − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , ∀v
⎫
⎬
⎭
. (24) 537
The constraint imposed on Q can be expressed in a concise 538
manner in the following theorem. 539
Theorem 2: To make sure that sˆv in Eq. (22) does become 540
the optimal solution of Problem 4 when ξv = 1, ∀v, the 541
sufficient and necessary condition to be satisfied is 542
Q > Qmin 
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qV − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , (25) 543
where qV is the minimum value in q according to Eq. (5). 544
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.  545
Remark 2: Observe from Eq. (25) that since q jqV increases 546
exponentially with γ according to Eq. (5), the value of Qmin 547
ensuring ξv = 1, ∀v, will increase exponentially with γ /3. 548
Note that we have Q ≤ N . In the case that Qmin in Eq. (25) 549
is larger than N for a high VR popularity exponent γ , some 550
VRs with the least popularity will be excluded from the game. 551
B. Further Discussion on Q 552
We define a series of variables Uv , ∀v, as follows: 553
Uv 
NC(δ, α)
(∑v
j=1 3
√
q j
qv − v
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , (26) 554
and formulate the following lemma. 555
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Lemma 3: Uv is a strictly monotonically-increasing func-556
tion of v, i.e., we have UV > UV−1 > · · · > U1.557
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. 558
For the special case of the previous subsection, the optimal559
solution for ξv = 1, ∀v, is found under the condition that the560
storage size obeys Q > UV . In other words, Q should be561
large enough such that every VR can participate in the game.562
However, when Q reduces, some VRs have to leave the game563
as a result of the increased competition. Then we have the564
following lemma.565
Lemma 4: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, the NSP can only retain566
at most the v VRs of V1, V2, · · · , Vv in the game for achieving567
its optimal solution.568
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E. 569
From Lemma 4, when we have Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, and given570
that there are u VRs, u ≤ v, in the game, we can have an571
optimal solution for s.572
Problem 5: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1 is satisfied, and given573
that there are u, u ≤ v, VRs in the game, we can formulate574
the following optimization problem as575
min
s	0
u∑
j=1
s j ,576
s.t.
u∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ (u + )
√
λ
sbh
. (27)577
Similar to the solution of Problem 4, we arrive at578
the optimal solution for the above problem as sˆu 579
[sˆ1,u, · · · , sˆi,u , · · · , sˆV ,u], where580
sˆi,u =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑u
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√i
λ(u + )2 , i = 1, · · · , u,
∞, i = u + 1, · · · , V .
581
(28)582
C. General Case583
Let us now focus our attention on the general solution of584
the original optimization problem, i.e., of Problem 3. Without585
loss of generality, we consider the case of Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1.586
Then Problem 3 is equivalent to the following problem.587
Problem 6: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, there are at most v588
VRs in the game. Then Problem 3 can be converted to589
min
ξ , s	0
v∑
j=1
ξ j
(
λs j −  j sbh
)
,590
s.t.
v∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
 j sbh
λs j
− 
)
≤ . (29)591
The problem in Eq. (29) is again non-convex due to the592
uncertainty of ξu , u = 1, · · · , v. We have to consider the593
cases, where there are u, ∀u, most popular VRs in the594
game. We observe that for a given u, Problem 6 converts595
to Problem 5. Therefore, to solve Problem 6, we first solve596
Problem 5 with a given u and obtain sˆu according to Eq. (28).597
TABLE I
THE CENTRALIZED ALGORITHM AT THE NSP FOR
OBTAINING THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION S
Then we choose the optimal solution, denoted by sv , among 598
sˆ1, · · · , sˆv as the solution to Problem 6, which is formulated as 599
sv 600
= arg min
sˆu
⎧
⎨
⎩
min
⎛
⎝
u∑
j=1
(
λs j −  j sbh
)
⎞
⎠ , u = 1, · · · , v
⎫
⎬
⎭
. 601
(30) 602
Based on the above discussions, we can see that the optimal 603
solution s of Problem 3 is a piece-wise function of Q, i.e., 604
s = sv when Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1. Now, we formulate the 605
solution s = [s1, · · · , sV ] to Problem 3 in a general manner 606
as follows. 607
sv =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑uˆ
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ(uˆ + )2 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ,
∞, v = uˆ + 1, · · · , V ,
608
(31) 609
where regarding uˆ, we have 610
uˆ = arg min
u
{Su : u = 1, 2, · · · , T }, (32) 611
with Su formulated as 612
Su =
u∑
j1=1
⎛
⎜
⎝
2sbh
(∑u
j2=1
3
√
 j2
)2
3
√
 j1
(u + )2 −  j1s
bh
⎞
⎟
⎠, 613
T =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, U1 < Q ≤ U2,
· · · ,
v, Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1,
· · · ,
V , UV < Q.
(33) 614
To gain a better understanding of the optimal solution in 615
Eq. (31), we propose a centralized algorithm at L in Table I 616
for obtaining s. 617
Remark 3: The optimal solution s in Eq. (31), combined 618
with the solution of τ  given by Eq. (18) in Lemma 1, 619
constitutes the SE for the Stackelberg game. 620
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Furthermore, by substituting the optimal s into the expres-621
sion of SN S P in Eq. (19), we get622
SN S P (s, τ )623
= 1

uˆ∑
j1=1
⎛
⎜
⎝ j1s
bh −
2sbh
(∑uˆ
j2=1
3
√
 j2
)2
3
√
 j1
(uˆ + )2
⎞
⎟
⎠.624
(34)625
Remark 4: Since we have v ∝ qv , ∀v, and qv increases626
exponentially with the VR preference parameter γ according627
to Eq. (5), SN S P (s, τ ) also increases exponentially with γ .628
VI. DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER SCHEMES629
Let us now consider two other schemes, namely, an uniform630
pricing scheme and a global optimization scheme.631
A. Uniform Pricing Scheme632
In contrast to the non-uniform pricing scheme of the previ-633
ous section, the uniform pricing scheme deliberately imposes634
the same price on the VRs in the game. We denote the fixed635
price by s. In this case, similar to Lemma 1, Problem 2 can636
be solved by637
τ v =
⎛
⎝
√
vsbh
2λ
√
1
s
− 

⎞
⎠
+
. (35)638
We first focus our attention on the special case of639
ξv = 1, ∀v. Then Problem 4 can be converted to that of640
minimizing s subject to the constraint ∑Vj=1
√
 j
s
≤ (V +641
)
√
λ
sbh
. We then obtain the optimal sˆ for this special case as642
sˆ =
sbh
(∑V
j=1
√
 j
)2
λ(V  + )2 . (36)643
To guarantee that all the VRs are capable of participating in644
the game, i.e., ξv = 1, ∀v, with the optimal price sˆ, we let645
sˆ < v s
bh
λ . Then we have the following constraint on the646
storage Q as647
Q > Q′min 
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1
√
q j
qV − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 . (37)648
We can see that the we require a larger storage size Q649
in Eq. (37) than that in Eq. (25) under the non-uniform650
pricing scheme to accommodate all the VRs, since we have651
∑V
j=1
√
q j
qV >
∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qV . Following Remark 2, we conclude652
that Q′min of the uniform pricing scheme will increase expo-653
nentially with γ /2.654
Then based on this special case, the optimal s =655
[s1, · · · , sV ] in the uniform pricing scheme can be readily656
obtained by following a similar method to that in the previous657
section. That is,658
sv =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑uˆ
j=1
√
 j
)2
λ(uˆ + )2 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ,
∞, v = uˆ + 1, · · · , V ,
(38)659
where regarding uˆ, we have 660
uˆ = arg min
u
{Su : u = 1, 2, · · · , T }, (39) 661
with 662
Su =
u2sbh
(∑u
j=1
√
 j
)2
(u + )2 −
u∑
j=1
 j sbh, 663
T =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, U¯1 < Q ≤ U¯2,
· · · ,
v, U¯v < Q ≤ U¯v+1,
· · · ,
V , U¯V < Q.
(40) 664
Note that U¯v in Eq. (40) is defined as 665
U¯v 
NC(δ, α)
(∑v
j=1
√
q j
qv − v
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 . (41) 666
It is clear that the uniform pricing scheme is inferior to the 667
non-uniform pricing scheme in terms of maximizing SN S P . 668
However, we will show in the following problem that the uni- 669
form pricing scheme offers the optimal solution to maximizing 670
the back-haul cost reduction SB H at the NSP in conjunction 671
with τ v , ∀v, from the followers. 672
Problem 7: With the aid of the optimal solutions τ v , ∀v, 673
from the followers, the maximization on SB H is achieved by 674
solving the following problem: 675
min
ξ , s	0
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
sbh
√
 j λ
√
s j −  j sbh
)
, 676
s.t.
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
 j sbh
λs j
− 
)
≤ . (42) 677
The optimal solution to Problem 7 can be readily shown 678
to be s given in Eq. (38). This proof follows the similar 679
procedure of the optimization method presented in the pre- 680
vious section. Thus it is skipped for brevity. In this sense, 681
the uniform pricing scheme is superior to the non-uniform 682
scheme in terms of reducing more cost on back-haul channel 683
transmissions. 684
B. Global Optimization Scheme 685
In the global optimization scheme, we are interested in the 686
sum profit of the NSP and VRs, which can be expressed as 687
SG L B = SN S P +
V∑
j=1
SV Rj 688
=
V∑
j1=1
F∑
j2=1
2 p j2q j1ζ K sbhτ j1
(A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1)τ j1 + C(δ, α)F
689
= 2SB H . (43) 690
Observe from Eq. (43), we can see that the sum profit SG L B is 691
twice the back-haul cost reduction SB H , where the vector τ is 692
the only variable of this maximization problem. 693
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Problem 8: The optimization of the sum profit SG L B can694
be formulated as695
max
τ	0
V∑
j1=1
τ j1
∑F
j2=1 p j2q j1ζ K s
bh
(A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1)τ j1 + C(δ, α)F
,696
s.t.
V∑
j=1
τ j ≤ 1. (44)697
Problem 8 is a typical water-filling optimization problem.698
By relying on the classic Lagrangian multiplier, we arrive at699
the optimal solution as700
τˆv =
⎛
⎝
√qv
η − C(δ, α)F
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1
⎞
⎠
+
, ∀v, (45)701
where we have η =
∑v¯
j=1
√q j
v¯C(δ,α)F+A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1, and v¯ satisfies702
the constraint of τˆv > 0.703
C. Comparisons704
Let us now compare the optimal SBS allocation variable τv705
in the context of the above two schemes. First, we investigate706
τ v in the uniform pricing scheme. By substituting Eq. (38)707
into Eq. (35), we have708
τ v =
⎛
⎝
√
vsbh
2λ
√
1
sv
− 

⎞
⎠
+
709
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
√qv
η′ − C(δ, α)F
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ
0, v = uˆ + 1, · · · , V ,
(46)710
where η′ =
∑uˆ
j=1
√q j
uˆC(δ,α)F+A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1, and uˆ ensures τ

v > 0.711
Then, comparing τ v given in Eq. (46) to the optimal712
solution τˆ of the global optimization scheme given by Eq. (45),713
we can see that these two solutions are the same. In other714
words, the uniform pricing scheme in fact represents the global715
optimization scheme in terms of maximizing the sum profit716
SG L B and maximizing the back-haul cost reduction SB H .717
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS718
In this section, we provide both numerical as well as719
Monte-Carlo simulation results for evaluating the performance720
of the proposed schemes. The physical layer parameters of721
our simulations, such as the path-loss exponent α, transmit722
power P of the SBSs and the noise power σ 2 are similar to723
those of the 3GPP standards. The unit of noise power and724
transmit power is Watt, while the SBS and MU intensities are725
expressed in terms of the numbers of the nodes per square726
kilometer.727
Explicitly, we set the path-loss exponent to α = 4, the728
SBS transmit power to P = 2 Watt, the noise power to729
σ 2 = 10−10 Watt, and the pre-set SINR threshold to δ = 0.01.730
For the file caching system, we set the number of files in731
F to N = 500 and set the number of VRs to V = 15.732
For the network deployments, we set the intensity of the733
Fig. 2. Comparisons between the simulations and analytical results on
Pr(Ev, f ). We consider four kinds of storage size Q in each SBS, i.e.,
Q = 10, 50, 100, 500, and three kinds of SBS intensity, i.e., λ = 10, 20, 30.
MUs to ζ = 50/km2, and investigate three cases of the SBS 734
deployments as λ = 10/km2, 20/km2 and 30/km2. 735
For the pricing system, the profit/U AP is considered to 736
be the profit gained per month within an area of one square 737
kilometer, i.e., /month · km2. We note that the profits gained 738
by the NSP and by the VRs are proportional to the cost sbh of 739
back-haul channels for transmitting a video. Hence, without 740
loss of generality, we set sbh = 1 for simplicity. Additionally, 741
we set K = 10/month, which is the average number of video 742
requests from an MU per month. 743
We first verify our derivation of Pr(Ev, f ) by comparing the 744
analytical results of Theorem 1 to the Monte-Carlo simulation 745
results. Upon verifying Pr(Ev, f ), we will investigate the 746
optimization results within the framework of the proposed 747
Stackelberg game by providing numerical results. 748
A. Performance Evaluation on Pr (Ev, f ) 749
For the Monte-Carlo simulations of this subsection, all the 750
average performances are evaluated over a thousand network 751
scenarios, where the distributions of the SBSs and the MUs 752
change from case to case according the PPPs characterized by 753
 and  , respectively. 754
Note that Pr(Ev, f ) in Theorem 1 is the probability that an 755
MU can obtain its requested video directly from the memory 756
of an SBS rented by Vv . We can see from the expression of 757
Pr(Ev, f ) in Eq. (7) that it is a function of the fraction τv 758
of the SBSs that are rented by Vv . Although τv should be 759
optimized according to the price charged by the NSP, here 760
we investigate a variety of τv values, varying from 0 to 1, to 761
verify the derivation of Pr(Ev, f ). 762
Fig. 2 shows our comparisons between the simulations 763
and analytical results on Pr(Ev, f ). We consider four different 764
storage sizes Q in each SBS by setting Q = 10, 50, 100, 500. 765
Correspondingly, we have four values for the number of file 766
groups, i.e., F = 50, 10, 5, 1. Furthermore, we consider the 767
SBS intensities of λ = 10, 20, 30. From Fig. 2, we can 768
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Fig. 3. The minimum number of Q that allows all the VRs to participate
in the game under different preference parameter γ . In the case that the
minimum Q is larger than N , it means that some VRs will be inevitable
excluded from the game.
see that the simulations results closely match the analytical769
results derived in Theorem 1. Our simulations show that the770
intensity λ does not affect Pr(Ev, f ), which is consistent with771
our analytical results. Furthermore, a larger Q leads to a higher772
value of Pr(Ev, f ). Hence, enlarging the storage size is helpful773
for achieving a higher probability of direct downloading.774
B. Impact of the VR Preference Parameter γ775
The preference distribution q of the VRs defined in Eq. (5)776
is an important factor in predetermining the system perfor-777
mance. Indeed, we can see from Eq. (5) that this distribution778
depends on the parameter γ . Generally, we have 0 < γ ≤ 1,779
with a larger γ representing a more uneven popularity among780
the VRs. First, we find the minimum Q that can keep all781
the VRs in the game. This minimum Q for the non-uniform782
pricing scheme (NUPS) is given by Eq. (25), while the783
minimum Q for the uniform-pricing scheme (UPS) is given by784
Eq. (37). From the two equations, this minimum Q increases785
exponentially with γ /3 in the NUPS, while it also increases786
exponentially with a higher exponent of γ /2 in the UPS.787
Fig. 3 shows this minimum Q for different values of the788
VR preference parameter γ .789
We can see that the UPS needs a larger Q than the NUPS790
for keeping all the VRs. This gap increases rapidly with the791
growth of γ . For example, for γ = 0.3, the uniform pricing792
scheme requires almost 80 more storages, while for γ = 0.6,793
it needs 200 more. We can also observe in Fig. 3 that for794
γ > 0.66 in the UPS and for γ > 0.98 in the NUPS,795
the minimum Q becomes larger than the overall number of796
videos N . In both cases, since we have Q ≤ N (Q > N797
results in the same performance as Q = N), some unpopular798
VRs will be excluded from the game.799
Next, we study the number of VR participants that stay in800
the game for the two schemes upon increasing γ . We can see801
from Fig. 4 that the number of VR participants keeps going802
down upon increasing γ in the both schemes. The NUPS803
Fig. 4. Number of participants, i.e., the VRs that are in the game, vs.
the preference parameter γ , under the two schemes. We also consider four
different values of the storage size Q, i.e., 10, 50, 100, 500.
Fig. 5. Various revenues, including S N S P and SG L B , vs. the preference
parameter γ , under the two schemes.
always keeps more VRs in the game than the UPS under 804
the same γ . At the same time, by considering Q = 805
10, 50, 100, 500, it is shown that for a given γ , a higher Q 806
will keep more VRs in the game. 807
Fig. 5 shows two kinds of revenues gained by the two 808
schemes for a given storage of Q = 500, namely, the global 809
profit SG L B defined in Eq. (43) and the profit of the NSP 810
SN S P defined in Eq. (9). Recall that we have SG L B = 2SB H 811
according to Eq. (43). We can see that the revenues of both 812
schemes increase exponentially upon increasing γ , as stated 813
in Remark 4. As our analytical result shows, the profit SN S P 814
gained by the NUPS is optimal and thus it is higher than 815
that gained by the UPS, while the UPS maximizes both 816
SG L B and SB H . Fig. 5 verifies the accuracy of our derivations. 817
C. Impact of the Storage Size Q 818
Since γ is a network parameter that is relatively fixed, 819
the NSP can adapt the storage size Q for controlling 820
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Fig. 6. Number of participants vs. the storage size Q, under the two schemes.
We also consider two different values of γ , i.e., γ = 0.3, 1.
Fig. 7. Various revenues, including S N S P and SG L B , vs. the storage size Q,
under the two schemes.
its performance. In this subsection, we investigate the per-821
formance as a function of Q. Fig. 6 shows the number of822
participants in the game versus Q, where γ = 0.3 and 1 are823
considered. It is shown that for a larger Q, more VRs are able824
to participate in the game. Again, the NUPS outperforms the825
UPS owing to its capability of accommodating more VRs for826
a given Q. By comparing the scenarios of γ = 0.3 and 1, we827
find that for γ = 0.3, a given increase of Q can accommodate828
more VRs in the game than γ = 1.829
Fig. 7 shows both SN S P and SG L B versus Q for the two830
schemes for a given γ = 1. We can see that the revenues of831
both schemes increase with the growth of Q. It is shown that832
the profit SN S P gained by the NUPS is higher than the one833
gained by the UPS, while the UPS outperforms the NUPS in834
terms of both SG L B and SB H .835
D. Individual VR Performance836
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of each837
individual VR, including the price charged to them for renting838
Fig. 8. Price charged on each VR for renting an SBS per month.
Fig. 9. The fraction of SBSs that are rented by each VR.
an SBS per month, and the fractions of the SBSs they rent 839
from the NSP. We fix γ = 0.5 and choose a large storage size 840
of Q = 500 for ensuring that all the VRs can be included. 841
Fig. 8 shows the price charged to each VR for renting an 842
SBS. The VRs are arranged according to their popularity 843
order, ranging from V1 to V15, with V1 having the highest 844
popularity and V15 the lowest one. We can see from the figure 845
that in the NUPS, the price for renting an SBS is higher for 846
the VRs having a higher popularity than those with a lower 847
popularity. By contrast, in the UPS, this price is fixed for all 848
the VRs. Fig. 9 shows the specific fraction of the rented SBSs 849
at each VR. In both schemes, the VRs associated with a high 850
popularity tend to rent more SBSs. The UPS in fact represents 851
an instance of the water-filling algorithm. Furthermore, the 852
UPS seems more aggressive than the NUPS, since the less 853
popular VRs of the UPS are more difficult to rent an SBS, 854
and thus these VRs are likely to be excluded from the game 855
with a higher probability. 856
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 857
In this paper, we considered a commercial small-cell 858
caching system consisting of an NSP and multiple VRs, where 859
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the NSP leases its SBSs to the VRs for gaining profits and for860
reducing the costs of back-haul channel transmissions, while861
the VRs, after storing popular videos to the rented SBSs, can862
provide faster transmissions to the MUs, hence gaining more863
profits. We proposed a Stackelberg game theoretic framework864
by viewing the SBSs as a type of resources. We first modeled865
the MUs and SBSs using two independent PPPs with the aid of866
stochastic geometry, and developed the probability expression867
of direct downloading. Then, based on the probability derived,868
we formulated a Stackelberg game for maximizing the average869
profit of the NSP as well as individual VRs. Next, we investi-870
gate the Stackelberg equilibrium by solving the associated non-871
convex optimization problem. We considered a non-uniform872
pricing scheme and an uniform pricing scheme. In the former873
scheme, the prices charged to each VR for renting an SBS874
are different, while the latter imposes the same price for875
each VR. We proved that the non-uniform pricing scheme876
can effectively maximize the profit of the NSP, while the877
uniform one maximizes the sum profit of the NSP and the VRs.878
Furthermore, we derived a relationship between the optimal879
pricing of renting an SBS, the fraction of SBSs rented by each880
VR, the storage size of each SBS and the popularity of the881
VRs. We verified by Monte-Carlo simulations that the direct882
downloading probability under our PPP model is consistent883
with our derived results. Then we provided several numerical884
results for showing that the proposed schemes are effective in885
both pricing and SBSs allocation.886
APPENDIX A887
PROOF OF THEOREM 1888
Recall that the SBSs allocated to the VR Vv and cache G f889
are modeled as a “thinned” HPPP v, f having the intensity890
of 1F τvλ. We consider a typical MU M who wishes to connect891
to the nearest SBS B in v, f . The event Ev, f represents that892
this SBS can support M with an SINR no lower than δ, and893
thus M can obtain the desired file from the cache of B.894
We carry out the analysis on Pr(Ev, f ) for the typical MU895
M located at the origin. Since the network is interference896
dominant, we neglect the noise in the following. We denote by897
z the distance between M and B, by xZ the location of B, and898
by ρ(xZ ) the received SINR at M from B. Then the average899
probability that M can download the desired video from B is900
Pr(ρ(xZ ) ≥ δ)901
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
⎛
⎜
⎝
hxZ z−α∑
x∈\{xZ }
hx ‖x‖−α ≥ δ
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
z
⎞
⎟
⎠ fZ (z) dz902
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
hxZ ≥
δ
(
∑
x∈\{xZ }
hx ‖x‖−α
)
z−α
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
z
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
903
2π
1
F
τvλz exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz904
=
∫ ∞
0
EI
(
exp
(−zαδ I )) 2π 1
F
τvλz exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz,905
(47)906
where we have I 
∑
x∈\{xZ }
hx ‖x‖−α , and the PDF of z, i.e., 907
fZ (z), is derived by the null probability of the HPPP v, f 908
with the intensity of 1F τvλ. More specifically in v, f , since 909
the number of the SBSs k in an area of A follows the Poisson 910
distribution, the probability of the event that there is no SBS 911
in the area with the radius of z can be calculated as [17] 912
Pr(k = 0 | A = πz2) = e−A 1F τvλ (A
1
F τvλ)
k
k! = e
−πz2 1F τvλ. 913
(48) 914
By using the above expression, we arrive at fZ (z) = 915
2π 1F τvλz exp
(−π 1F τvλz2
)
. Note that the interference I con- 916
sists of I1 and I2, where I1 emanates from the SBSs in  917
excluding v, f , while I2 is from the SBSs in v, f excluding 918
B. The SBSs contributing to I1, denoted by v, f , have the 919
intensity of
(
1 − 1F τv
)
λ, while those contributing to I2 have 920
the intensity of 1F τvλ. 921
Correspondingly, the calculation of EI (exp (−zαδ I )) will 922
be split into the product of two expectations over I1 and I2. 923
The expectation over I1 is calculated as 924
EI1
(
exp
(−zαδ I1
))
925
(a)= Ev, f
⎛
⎝
∏
x∈v
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−zαδhx ‖x‖−α
)
exp(−hx)dhx
⎞
⎠ 926
(b)= exp
(
−
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λ
∫
R2
(
1 − 1
1 + zαδ ‖xk‖−α
)
dxk
)
927
= exp
(
−2π
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λ
1
α
z2δ
2
α B
(
2
α
, 1 − 2
α
))
, 928
= exp
(
−π
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λC(δ, α)z2
)
, (49) 929
where (a) is based on the independence of chan- 930
nel fading, while (b) follows from E
(
∏
x
u (x)
)
= 931
exp
(−λ ∫
R2 (1 − u (x)) dx
)
, where x ∈  and  is an PPP in 932
R
2 with the intensity λ [24], and C(δ, α) has been defined as 933
2
α δ
2
α B
( 2
α , 1 − 2α
)
. 934
The expectation over I2 has to take into account z as the 935
distance from the nearest interfering SBS. Then we have 936
EI2
(
exp(−zαδ I2)
)
937
= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλ2π
∫ ∞
z
(
1 − 1
1 + zαδr−α
)
rdr
)
938
(a)= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλπδ
2
α z2
2
α
∫ ∞
δ−1
κ
2
α −1
1 + κ dx
)
939
(b)= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλπδz
2 2
α − 2 2 F1
(
1, 1 − 2
α
; 2 − 2
α
; −δ
))
, 940
(50) 941
where (a) defines κ  δ−1z−αrα , and 2 F1(·) 942
in (b) is the hypergeometric function. As we 943
defined A(δ, α) = 2δα−2 2 F1
(
1, 1 − 2α ; 2 − 2α ; −δ
)
, by 944
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substituting (49) and (50) into (47), we have945
Pr(ρ(xZ ) ≥ δ)946
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−π
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λC(δ, α)z2
)
947
exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2A(δ, α)
)
2π
1
F
τvλz exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz948
=
1
F τv
C(δ, α)(1 − 1F τv) + A(δ, α) 1F τv + 1F τv
. (51)949
This completes the proof. 950
APPENDIX B951
PROOF OF LEMMA 2952
By applying Lagrangian multipliers to the objective func-953
tion, we have954
L(s, μ, ν)955
=
V∑
j=1
s j + μ
⎛
⎝
V∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
− (V  + )
√
λ
sbh
⎞
⎠ −
V∑
j=1
ν j s j ,956
(52)957
where μ and ν j are non-negative multipliers associated with958
the constraints
∑V
j=1
√
 j
s j −(V+)
√
λ
sbh
≤ 0 and s j ≥ 0,959
respectively. Then the KKT conditions can be written as960
∂L(s, μ, ν)
∂s j
= 0, ∀ j = 1, · · · , V ,961
μ
⎛
⎝
V∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
−(V+)
√
λ
sbh
⎞
⎠ = 0, and ν j s j = 0, ∀ j.962
(53)963
From the first line of Eq. (53), we have964
s j = 3
√
μ2 j
4(1 − ν j )2 . (54)965
Obviously, we have s j = 0, ∀ j , otherwise the constraint966
∑V
j=1
√
 j
s j − (V  + )
√
λ
sbh
≤ 0 cannot be satisfied.967
Thus, we have ν j = 0, ∀ j . Furthermore, we have μ = 0968
according to Eq. (54) since s j is non-zero. This means that969
∑V
j=1
√
 j
s j − (V + )
√
λ
sbh
= 0.970
By substituting Eq. (54) into this constraint, we have971
3√μ =
√
sbh
∑V
j=1 3
√
2 j√
λ(V  + ) . (55)972
Then it follows that973
s j =
sbh
(∑V
v=1 3
√
v
)2
3
√
 j
λ(V  + )2 . (56)974
This completes the proof. 975
APPENDIX C 976
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 977
As discussed in Eq. (23) and Eq. (24), we have proved that 978
Q > NC(δ,α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√ q j
qV
−V
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 is a sufficient condition for the 979
optimal solution in Eq. (22). In other words, as long as Q is 980
satisfied, we have the conclusion that the solution in Eq. (22) 981
is optimal and ξv = 1, ∀v. 982
Next, we prove the necessary aspect. Without loss of 983
generality, we assume that 984
NC(δ, α)
(∑V−1
j=1 3
√
q j
qV −1 − V + 1
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 < Q 985
≤
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qV − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 . (57) 986
This leads to sV ≥ v sbhλ , and the VR VV will be excluded 987
from the game. In this case, we have ξ j = 1, j = 1, · · · , V −1, 988
and Problem 4 will be rewritten as follows. 989
Problem 9: We rewrite Problem 4 as 990
min
s	0
V−1∑
j=1
s j , 991
s.t.
V−1∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ ((V − 1) + )
√
λ
sbh
. (58) 992
Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, and combined with the 993
constraint of Q in Eq. (57), the optimal solution of Problem 9 994
is given by 995
sˆv =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑V−1
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ((V − 1) + )2 , v = 1, · · · , V − 1,
∞, v = V .
996
(59) 997
We can see that the optimal solution given in Eq. (59) 998
contradicts to the optimal solution of Problem 4 given in 999
Eq. (22). Hence, Q > NC(δ,α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√ q j
qV
−V
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 is a necessary 1000
condition for finding the optimal solution in Eq. (22). This 1001
completes the proof.  1002
APPENDIX D 1003
PROOF OF LEMMA 3 1004
Consider v1, v2 = 1, · · · , V and v1 = v2 + 1. Then we 1005
prove that Uv1 > Uv2 . We have 1006
Uv1 =
NC(δ, α)
(∑v1
j=1 3
√ q j
qv1
− v1
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 1007
=
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1 3
√ q j
qv1
−v2+∑v1j=v2+1 3
√ q j
qv1
−(v1−v2)
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 1008
=
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1 3
√ q j
qv1
−v2
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 1009
(a)
>
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1 3
√ q j
qv2
− v2
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 = Uv2, (60) 1010
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where (a) comes from the fact that qv1 < qv2 . This completes1011
the proof. 1012
APPENDIX E1013
PROOF OF LEMMA 41014
It is plausible that if L can only keep at most v VRs, it has1015
to retain the v most popular VRs to maximize its profit. Let1016
us now prove that if L keeps (v +w) VRs, w = 1, · · · , V −v,1017
in the game, it cannot achieve the optimal solution for1018
Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1.1019
Problem 10: In the case that L keeps (v+w) VRs, we have1020
the optimization problem of1021
min
s	0
v+w∑
j=1
s j ,1022
s.t.
v+w∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ ((v + w) + )
√
λ
sbh
. (61)1023
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain that Q >1024
NC(δ,α)
(∑v+w
j=1 3
√ q j
qv+w −(v+w)
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 = Uv+w is the necessary con-1025
dition for the (v + w) VRs to participate in the game. This1026
contradicts to the premise Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, since we have1027
Q > Uv+1 according to Lemma 3. Let us now consider1028
the cases of w′ = 0,−1, · · · , 1 − v. To ensure there are1029
(v + w′) VRs in the game, Q has to satisfy the condition1030
that Q > Uv+w′ . Since Q > Uv ≥ Uv+w′ , this implies that1031
given (v + w′) VRs in the game, the NSP can achieve an1032
optimal solution. This completes the proof. 1033
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Abstract— Evidence indicates that downloading on-demandAQ:1 1
videos accounts for a dramatic increase in data traffic over2
cellular networks. Caching popular videos in the storage of small-3
cell base stations (SBS), namely, small-cell caching, is an efficient4
technology for reducing the transmission latency while mitigating5
the redundant transmissions of popular videos over back-haul6
channels. In this paper, we consider a commercialized small-cell7
caching system consisting of a network service provider (NSP),8
several video retailers (VRs), and mobile users (MUs). The9
NSP leases its SBSs to the VRs for the purpose of making10
profits, and the VRs, after storing popular videos in the rented11
SBSs, can provide faster local video transmissions to the MUs,12
thereby gaining more profits. We conceive this system within the13
framework of Stackelberg game by treating the SBSs as specific14
types of resources. We first model the MUs and SBSs as two15
independent Poisson point processes, and develop, via stochastic16
geometry theory, the probability of the specific event that an17
MU obtains the video of its choice directly from the memory of18
an SBS. Then, based on the probability derived, we formulate a19
Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the average profit of both20
the NSP and the VRs. In addition, we investigate the Stackelberg21
equilibrium by solving a non-convex optimization problem. With22
the aid of this game theoretic framework, we shed light on23
the relationship between four important factors: the optimal24
pricing of leasing an SBS, the SBSs allocation among the VRs,25
the storage size of the SBSs, and the popularity distribution26
of the VRs. Monte Carlo simulations show that our stochastic27
geometry-based analytical results closely match the empirical28
ones. Numerical results are also provided for quantifying the29
proposed game-theoretic framework by showing its efficiency on30
pricing and resource allocation.
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I. INTRODUCTION 34
W IRELESS data traffic is expected to increase exponen- 35tially in the next few years driven by a staggering 36
proliferation of mobile users (MU) and their bandwidth- 37
hungry mobile applications. There is evidence that streaming 38
of on-demand videos by the MUs is the major reason for 39
boosting the tele-traffic over cellular networks [1]. According 40
to the prediction of mobile data traffic by Cisco, mobile video 41
streaming will account for 72% of the overall mobile data 42
traffic by 2019. The on-demand video downloading involves 43
repeated wireless transmission of videos that are requested 44
multiple times by different users in a completely asynchronous 45
manner, which is different from the transmission style of live 46
video streaming. 47
Often, there are numerous repetitive requests of popular 48
videos from the MUs, such as online blockbusters, leading 49
to redundant video transmissions. The redundancy of data 50
transmissions can be reduced by locally storing popular videos, 51
known as caching, into the storage of intermediate network 52
nodes, effectively forming a local caching system [1], [2]. 53
The local caching brings video content closer to the MUs 54
and alleviates redundant data transmissions via redirecting the 55
downloading requests to the intermediate nodes. 56
Generally, wireless data caching consists of two stages: 57
data placement and data delivery [3]. In the data placement 58
stage, popular videos are cached into local storages during 59
off-peak periods, while during the data delivery stage, videos 60
requested are delivered from the local caching system to 61
the MUs. Recent works advanced the caching solutions of 62
both device-to-device (D2D) networks and wireless sensor 63
networks [4]–[6]. Specifically, in [4] a caching scheme was 64
proposed for a D2D based cellular network relaying on 65
the MUs’ caching of popular video content. In this scheme, the 66
D2D cluster size was optimized for reducing the downloading 67
delay. In [5] and [6], the authors proposed novel caching 68
schemes for wireless sensor networks, where the protocol 69
model of [7] was adopted. 70
Since small-cell embedded architectures will dominate 71
in future cellular networks, known as heterogeneous net- 72
works (HetNet) [8]–[13], caching relying on small-cell base 73
stations (SBS), namely, small-cell caching, constitutes a 74
promising solution for HetNets. The advantages brought about 75
by small-cell caching are threefold. Firstly, popular videos are 76
placed closer to the MUs when they are cached in SBSs, hence 77
0733-8716 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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reducing the transmission latency. Secondly, redundant trans-78
missions over SBSs’ back-haul channels, which are usually79
expensive [14], can be mitigated. Thirdly, the majority of video80
traffic is offloaded from macro-cell base stations to SBSs.81
In [15], a small-cell caching scheme, named82
‘Femtocaching’, is proposed for a cellular network having83
embedded SBSs, where the data placement at the SBSs is84
optimized in a centralized manner for the sake of reducing85
the transmission delay imposed. However, [15] considers an86
idealized system, where neither the interference nor the impact87
of wireless channels is taken into account. The associations88
between the MUs and the SBSs are pre-determined without89
considering the specific channel conditions encountered.90
In [16], small-cell caching is investigated in the context of91
stochastic networks. The average performance is quantified92
with the aid of stochastic geometry [17], [18], where the93
distribution of network nodes is modeled by Poisson point94
process (PPP). However, the caching strategy of [16] assumes95
that the SBSs cache the same content, hence leading to a96
sub-optimal solution.97
As detailed above, current research on wireless caching98
mainly considers the data placement issue optimized for reduc-99
ing the downloading delay. However, the entire caching system100
design involves numerous issues apart from data placement.101
From a commercial perspective, it will be more interesting102
to consider the topics of pricing for video streaming, the103
rental of local storage, and so on. A commercialized caching104
system may consist of video retailers (VR), network service105
providers (NSP) and MUs. The VRs, e.g., Youtube, purchase106
copyrights from video producers and publish the videos on107
their web-sites. The NSPs are typically operators of cellular108
networks, who are in charge of network facilities, such as109
macro-cell base stations and SBSs.110
In such a commercial small-cell caching system, the VRs’111
revenue is acquired from providing video streaming for112
the MUs. As the central servers of the VRs, which store113
the popular videos, are usually located in the backbone net-114
works and far away from the MUs, an efficient solution is115
to locally cache these videos, thereby gaining more profits116
from providing faster local transmissions. In turn, these local117
caching demands raised by the VRs offer the NSPs prof-118
itable opportunities from leasing their SBSs. Additionally, the119
NSPs can save considerable costs due to reduced redundant120
video transmissions over SBSs’ back-haul channels. In this121
sense, both the VRs and NSPs are the beneficiaries of the122
local caching system. However, each entity is selfish and123
wishes to maximize its own benefit, raising a competition124
and optimization problem among these entities, which can be125
effectively solved within the framework of game theory.126
We note that game theory has been successfully applied127
to wireless communications for solving resource allocation128
problems. In [19], the authors propose a dynamic spectrum129
leasing mechanism via power control games. In [20],130
a price-based power allocation scheme is proposed for spec-131
trum sharing in Femto-cell networks based on Stackelberg132
game. Game theoretical power control strategies for maxi-133
mizing the utility in spectrum sharing networks are studied134
in [21] and [22].135
In this paper, we propose a commercial small-cell caching 136
system consisting of an NSP, multiple VRs and MUs. We opti- 137
mize such a system within the framework of Stackelberg game 138
by viewing the SBSs as a specific type of resources for the 139
purpose of video caching. Generally speaking, Stackelberg 140
game is a strategic game that consists of a leader and several 141
followers competing with each other for certain resources [23]. 142
The leader moves first and the followers move subsequently. 143
Correspondingly, in our game theoretic caching system, we 144
consider the NSP to be the leader and the VRs as the followers. 145
The NSP sets the price of leasing an SBS, while the VRs 146
compete with each other for renting a fraction of the SBSs. 147
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, our work is the first 148
of its kind that optimizes a caching system with the aid of 149
game theory. Compared to many other game theory based 150
resource allocation schemes, where the power, bandwidth 151
and time slots are treated as the resources, our work has 152
a totally different profit model, established based on our 153
coverage derivations. In particular, our contributions are as 154
follows. 155
1) By following the stochastic geometry framework 156
of [17] and [18], we model the MUs and SBSs in 157
the network as two different ties of a Poisson point 158
process (PPP) [24]. Under this network model, we define 159
the concept of a successful video downloading event 160
when an MU obtains the requested video directly from 161
the storage of an SBS. Then we quantify the probability 162
of this event based on stochastic geometry theory. 163
2) Based on the probability derived, we develop a profit 164
model of our caching system and formulate the profits 165
gained by the NSP and the VRs from SBSs leasing and 166
renting. 167
3) A Stackelberg game is proposed for jointly maximizing 168
the average profit of the NSP and the VRs. Given this 169
game theoretic framework, we investigate a non-uniform 170
pricing scheme, where the price charged to different VRs 171
varies. 172
4) Then we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium of this 173
scheme via solving a non-convex optimization problem. 174
It is interesting to observe that the optimal solution is 175
related both to the storage size of each SBS and to the 176
popularity distribution of the VRs. 177
5) Furthermore, we consider an uniform pricing scheme. 178
We find that although the uniform pricing scheme is 179
inferior to the non-uniform one in terms of maximizing 180
the NSP’s profit, it is capable of reducing more back- 181
haul costs compared with the latter and achieves the 182
maximum sum profit of the NSP and the VRs. 183
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe 184
the system model in Section II and establish the related profit 185
model in Section III. We then formulate Stackelberg game for 186
our small-cell caching system in Section IV. In Section V, 187
we investigate Stackelberg equilibrium for the non-uniform 188
pricing scheme by solving a non-convex optimization prob- 189
lem, while in Section VI, we further consider the uniform 190
pricing scheme. Our simulations and numerical results are 191
detailed in Section VII, while our conclusions are provided 192
in Section VIII. 193
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Fig. 1. An example of the small-cell caching system with four VRs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL194
We consider a commercial small-cell caching system con-
AQ:3
195
sisting of an NSP, V VRs, and a number of MUs. Let us196
denote by L the NSP, by V = {V1, V2, · · · , VV } the set of the197
VRs, and by M one of the MUs. Fig. 1 shows an example of198
our caching system relying on four VRs. In such a system, the199
VRs wish to rent the SBSs from L for placing their videos.200
Both the NSP and each VR aim for maximizing their profits.201
There are three stages in our system. In the first stage, the202
VRs purchase the copyrights of popular videos from video203
producers and publish them on their web-sites. In the second204
stage, the VRs negotiate with the NSP on the rent of SBSs205
for caching these popular videos. In the third stage, the MUs206
connect to the SBSs for downloading the desired videos.207
We will particulary focus our attention on the second and third208
stages within this game theoretic framework.209
A. Network Model210
Let us consider a small-cell based caching network com-211
posed of the MUs and the SBSs owned by L, where each212
SBS is deployed with a fixed transmit power P and the storage213
of Q video files. Let us assume that the SBSs transmit over214
the channels that are orthogonal to those of the macro-cell215
base stations, and thus there is no interference incurred by the216
macro-cell base stations. Also, assume that these SBSs are217
spatially distributed according to a homogeneous PPP (HPPP)218
 of intensity λ. Here, the intensity λ represents the number of219
the SBSs per unit area. Furthermore, we model the distribution220
of the MUs as an independent HPPP  of intensity ζ .221
The wireless down-link channels spanning from the SBSs222
to the MUs are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.),223
and modeled as the combination of path-loss and Rayleigh224
fading. Without loss of generality, we carry out our analysis225
for a typical MU located at the origin. The path-loss between226
an SBS located at x and the typical MU is denoted by ‖x‖−α ,227
where α is the path-loss exponent. The channel power of228
the Rayleigh fading between them is denoted by hx , where229
hx ∼ exp(1). The noise at an MU is Gaussian distributed230
with a variance σ 2.231
We consider the steady-state of a saturated network, where232
all the SBSs keep on transmitting data in the entire frequency233
band allocated. This modeling approach for saturated networks234
characterizes the worst-case scenario of the real systems,235
which has been adopted by numerous studies on PPP analysis,236
such as [18]. Hence, the received signal-to-interference-plus- 237
noise ratio (SINR) at the typical MU from an SBS located at 238
x can be expressed as 239
ρ(x) = Phx‖x‖
−α
∑
x ′∈\x Phx ′ ‖x ′‖−α + σ 2
. (1) 240
The typical MU is considered to be “covered” by an 241
SBS located at x as long as ρ(x) is no lower than a pre-set 242
SINR threshold δ, i.e., 243
ρ(x) ≥ δ. (2) 244
Generally, an MU can be covered by multiple SBSs. Note that 245
the SINR threshold δ defines the highest delay of downloading 246
a video file. Since the quality and code rate of a video clip 247
have been specified within the video file, the download delay 248
will be the major factor predetermining the QoS perceived by 249
the mobile users. Therefore, we focus our attention on the 250
coverage and SINR in the following derivations. 251
B. Popularity and Preferences 252
We now model the popularity distribution, i.e., the distri- 253
bution of request probabilities, among the popular videos to 254
be cached. Let us denote by F = {F1, F2, · · · , FN } the file 255
set consisting of N video files, where each video file contains 256
an individual movie or video clip that is frequently requested 257
by MUs. The popularity distribution of F is represented by a 258
vector t = [t1, t2, · · · , tN ]. That is, the MUs make independent 259
requests of the n-th video Fn , n = 1, · · · , N , with the 260
probability of tn . Generally, t can be modeled by the Zipf 261
distribution [25] as 262
tn = 1/n
β
∑N
j=1 1/jβ
, ∀n, (3) 263
where the exponent β is a positive value, characterizing the 264
video popularity. A higher β corresponds to a higher content 265
reuse, where the most popular files account for the majority 266
of download requests. From Eq. (3), the file with a smaller n 267
corresponds to a higher popularity. 268
Note that each SBS can cache at most Q video files, and 269
usually Q is no higher than the number of videos in F , i.e., 270
we have Q ≤ N . Without loss of generality, we assume that 271
N/Q is an integer. The N files in F are divided into F = N/Q 272
file groups (FG), with each FG containing Q video files. The 273
n-th video, ∀n ∈ {( f − 1)Q + 1, · · · , f Q}, is included in the 274
f -th FG, f = 1, · · · , F . Denote by G f the f -th FG, and by 275
p f the probability of the MUs’ requesting a file in G f , and 276
we have 277
p f =
f Q∑
n=( f −1)Q+1
tn, ∀ f. (4) 278
File caching is then carried out on the basis of FGs, where 279
each SBS caches one of the F FGs. 280
At the same time, the MUs have unbalanced preferences 281
with regard to the V VRs, i.e., some VRs are more popular 282
than others. For example, the majority of the MUs may tend 283
to access Youtube for video streaming. The preference distri- 284
bution among the VRs is denoted by q = [q1, q2, · · · , qV ], 285
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where qv , v = 1, · · · , V , represents the probability that the286
MUs prefer to download videos from Vv . The preference287
distribution q can also be modeled by the Zipf distribution.288
Hence, we have289
qv = 1/v
γ
∑V
j=1 1/jγ
, ∀v, (5)290
where γ is a positive value, characterizing the preference of291
the VRs. A higher γ corresponds to a higher probability of292
accessing the most popular VRs.293
C. Video Placement and Download294
Next, we introduce the small-cell caching system with its295
detailed parameters. In the first stage, each VR purchases the296
N popular videos in F from the producers and publishes these297
videos on its web-site. In the second stage, upon obtaining298
these videos, the VRs negotiate with the NSP L for renting299
its SBSs. As L leases its SBSs to multiple VRs, we denote by300
τ = [τ1, τ2, · · · , τV ] the fraction vector, where τv represents301
the fraction of the SBSs that are assigned to Vv , ∀v. We assume302
that the SBSs rented by each VR are uniformly distributed.303
Hence, the SBSs that are allocated to Vv can be modeled as304
a “thinned” HPPP v with intensity τvλ.305
The data placements of the second stage commence during306
network off-peak time after the VRs obtain access to the SBSs.307
During the placements, each SBS will be allocated with one of308
the F FGs. Generally, we assume that the VRs do not have the309
a priori information regarding the popularity distribution of F .310
This is because the popularity of videos is changing periodi-311
cally, and can only be obtained statistically after these videos312
quit the market. It is clear that each VR may have more or313
less some statistical information on the popularity distribution314
of videos based on the MUs’ downloading history. However,315
this information will be biased due to limited sampling. In this316
case, the VRs will uniformly assign the F FGs to the SBSs317
with equal probability of 1F for simplicity. We are interested in318
investigating the uniform assignment of video files for drawing319
a bottom line of the system performance. As the FGs are320
randomly assigned, the SBSs in v that cache the FG G f can321
be further modeled as a “more thinned” HPPP v, f with an322
intensity of 1F τvλ.323
In the third stage, the MUs start to download videos. When324
an MU M requires a video of G f from Vv , it searches the SBSs325
in v, f and tries to connect to the nearest SBS that covers M .326
Provided that such an SBS exists, the MU M will obtain this327
video directly from this SBS, and we thereby define this event328
by Ev, f . By contrast, if such an SBS does not exist, M will329
be redirected to the central servers of Vv for downloading330
the requested file. Since the servers of Vv are located at the331
backbone network, this redirection of the demand will trigger332
a transmission via the back-haul channels of the NSP L, hence333
leading to an extra cost.334
III. PROFIT MODELING335
We now focus on modeling the profit of the NSP and336
the VRs obtained from the small-cell caching system. The337
average profit is developed based on stochastically geometrical338
distributions of the network nodes in terms of per unit area 339
times unit period (/U AP), e.g., /month · km2. 340
A. Average Profit of the NSP 341
For the NSP L, the revenue gained from the caching system 342
consists of two parts: 1) the income gleaned from leasing SBSs 343
to the VRs and 2) the cost reduction due to reduced usage of 344
the SBSs’ back-haul channels. First, the leasing income/U AP 345
of L can be calculated as 346
SRT =
V∑
j=1
τ jλs j , (6) 347
where s j is the price per unit period charged to V j for 348
renting an SBS. Then we formulate the saved cost/U AP 349
due to reduced back-haul channel transmissions. When an 350
MU demands a video in G f from Vv , we derive the probability 351
Pr(Ev, f ) as follows. 352
Theorem 1: The probability of the event Ev, f , ∀v, f , can 353
be expressed as 354
Pr(Ev, f ) = τvC(δ, α)(F − τv) + A(δ, α)τv + τv , (7) 355
where we have A(δ, α)  2δα−2 2 F1
(
1, 1 − 2α ; 2 − 2α ; −δ
)
356
and C(δ, α)  2α δ
2
α B
( 2
α , 1 − 2α
)
. Furthermore, 2 F1(·) in 357
the function A(δ, α) is the hypergeometric function, while 358
the Beta function in C(δ, α) is formulated as B(x, y) = 359∫ 1
0 t
x−1(1 − t)y−1dt . 360
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.  361
Remark 1: From Theorem 1, it is interesting to observe that 362
the probability Pr(Ev, f ) is independent of both the transmit 363
power P and the intensity λ of the SBSs. Furthermore, since 364
Q is inversely proportional to F , we can enhance Pr(Ev, f ) by 365
increasing the storage size Q. 366
We assume that there are on average K video requests from 367
each MU within unit period, and that the average back-haul 368
cost for a video transmission is sbh . Based on Pr(Ev, f ) in 369
Eq. (7), we obtain the cost reduction/U AP for the back-haul 370
channels of L as 371
SB H =
F∑
j1=1
V∑
j2=1
p j1q j2ζ K Pr(E j2, j1)s
bh . (8) 372
By combining the above two items, the overall profit/U AP 373
for L can be expressed as 374
SN S P = SRT + SB H . (9) 375
B. Average Profit of the VRs 376
Note that the MUs can download the videos either from the 377
memories of the SBSs directly or from the servers of the VRs 378
at backbone networks via back-haul channels. In the first case, 379
the MUs will be levied by the VRs an extra amount of money 380
in addition to the videos’ prices because of the higher-rate 381
local streaming, namely, local downloading surcharge (LDS). 382
We assume that the LDS of each video is set as sld . Then the 383
revenue/U AP for a VR Vv gained from the LDS can be 384
calculated as 385
SL Dv =
F∑
j=1
p j qvζ K Pr(Ev, j )sld . (10) 386
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Additionally, Vv pays for renting the SBSs from L. The related387
cost/U AP can be written as388
SRTv = τvλsv . (11)389
Upon combining the two items, the profit/U AP for Vv , ∀v,390
can be expressed as391
SV Rv = SL Dv − SRTv . (12)392
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION393
In this section, we first present the Stackelberg game for-394
mulation for our price-based SBS allocation scheme. Then the395
equilibrium of the proposed game is investigated.396
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation397
Again, Stackelberg game is a strategic game that consists of398
a leader and several followers competing with each other for399
certain resources [23]. The leader moves first and the followers400
move subsequently. In our small-cell caching system, we401
model the NSP L as the leader, and the V VRs as the followers.402
The NSP imposes a price vector s = [s1, s2, · · · , sV ] for403
the lease of its SBSs, where sv , ∀v, has been defined in the404
previous section as the price per unit period charged on Vv405
for renting an SBS. After the price vector s is set, the VRs406
update the fraction τv , ∀v, that they tend to rent from L.407
1) Optimization Formulation of the Leader: Observe from408
the above game model that the NSP’s objective is to maximize409
its profit SN S P formulated in Eq. (9). Note that for ∀v, the410
fraction τv is a function of the price sv under the Stackelberg411
game formulation. This means that the fraction of the SBSs412
that each VR is willing to rent depends on the specific price413
charged to them for renting an SBS. Consequently, the NSP414
has to find the optimal price vector s for maximizing its profit.415
This optimization problem can be summarized as follows.416
Problem 1: The optimization problem of maximizing L’s417
profit can be formulated as418
max
s	0 S
N S P (s, τ ),419
s.t.
V∑
j=1
τ j ≤ 1. (13)420
2) Optimization Formulation of the Followers: The profit421
gained by the VR Vv in Eq. (12) can be further written as422
SV Rv (τv , sv ) =
F∑
j=1
p j qvζ K Pr(Ev, j )sld − τvλsv423
=
F∑
j=1
p j qvζ K sldτv
(A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1)τv + C(δ, α)F424
−λsv τv . (14)425
We can see from Eq. (14) that once the price sv is fixed, the426
profit of Vv depends on τv , i.e., the fraction of SBSs that427
are rented by Vv . If Vv increases the fraction τv , it will gain428
more revenue by levying surcharges from more MUs, while429
at the same time, Vv will have to pay for renting more SBSs.430
Therefore, τv has to be optimized for maximizing the profit 431
of Vv . This optimization can be formulated as follows. 432
Problem 2: The optimization problem of maximizing Vv ’s 433
profit can be written as 434
max
τv≥0
SV Rv (τv , sv ). (15) 435
Problem 1 and Problem 2 together form a Stackelberg 436
game. The objective of this game is to find the Stackelberg 437
Equilibrium (SE) points from which neither the leader (NSP) 438
nor the followers (VRs) have incentives to deviate. In the 439
following, we investigate the SE points for the proposed game. 440
B. Stackelberg Equilibrium 441
For our Stackelberg game, the SE is defined as follows. 442
Definition 1: Let s  [s1, s2, · · · , sV ] be a solution for 443
Problem 1, and τ v be a solution for Problem 2, ∀v. Define 444
τ   [τ 1 , τ 2 , · · · , τ V ]. Then the point (s, τ ) is an SE for 445
the proposed Stackelberg game if for any (s, τ ) with s 	 0 446
and τ 	 0, the following conditions are satisfied: 447
SN S P (s, τ ) ≥ SN S P (s, τ ), 448
SV Rv (sv , τ v ) ≥ SV Rv (sv , τv ), ∀v. (16) 449
Generally speaking, the SE of a Stackelberg game can be 450
obtained by finding its perfect Nash Equilibrium (NE). In our 451
proposed game, we can see that the VRs strictly compete 452
in a non-cooperative fashion. Therefore, a non-cooperative 453
subgame on controlling the fractions of rented SBSs is for- 454
mulated at the VRs’ side. For a non-cooperative game, the 455
NE is defined as the operating points at which no players can 456
improve utility by changing its strategy unilaterally. At the 457
NSP’s side, since there is only one player, the best response 458
of the NSP is to solve Problem 1. To achieve this, we need to 459
first find the best response functions of the followers, based 460
on which, we solve the best response function for the leader. 461
Therefore, in our game, we first solve Problem 2 given a 462
price vector s. Then with the obtained best response function 463
τ  of the VRs, we solve Problem 1 for the optimal price s. In 464
the following, we will have an in-depth investigation on this 465
game theoretic optimization. 466
V. GAME THEORETIC OPTIMIZATION 467
In this section, we will solve the optimization problem in 468
our game under the non-uniform pricing scheme, where the 469
NSP L charges the VRs with different prices s1, · · · , sV for 470
renting an SBS. In this scheme, we first solve Problem 2 at 471
the VRs, and rewrite Eq. (14) as 472
SV Rv (τv , sv ) =
vs
ldτv
τv +  − λsv τv .0 (17) 473
where v 
∑F
j=1 p j qvζ K ,   A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1, and 474
  C(δ, α)F . We observe that Eq. (17) is a concave function 475
over the variable τv . Thus, we can obtain the optimal solution 476
by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and we 477
have the following lemma. 478
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Lemma 1: For a given price sv , the optimal solution of479
Problem 2 is480
τ v =
⎛
⎝
√
vsld
2λ
√
1
sv
− 

⎞
⎠
+
, (18)481
where (·)+  max(·, 0).482
Proof: The optimal solution τ v of Vv can be obtained by483
deriving SV Rv with respect to τv and solving
dSV Rv
dτv = 0 under484
the constraint that τv ≥ 0. 485
We can see from Lemma 1 that if the price sv is set too486
high, i.e., sv ≥ v sldλ , the VR Vv will opt out for renting any487
SBS from L due the high price charged. Consequently, the488
VR Vv will not participate in the game.489
In the following derivations, we assume that the LDS on490
each video sld is set by the VRs to be the cost of a video trans-491
mission via back-haul channels sbh . The rational behind this492
assumption is as follows. Since a local downloading reduce a493
back-haul transmission, this saved back-haul transmission can494
be potentially utilized to provide extra services (equivalent to495
the value of sbh ) for the MUs. In addition, the MUs enjoy the496
benefit from faster local video transmissions. In light of this,497
it is reasonable to assume that the MUs are willing to accept498
the price sbh for a local video transmission.499
Substituting the optimal τ v of Eq. (18) into Eq. (9) and500
carry out some further manipulations, we arrive at501
SN S P =
V∑
j=1
λs j
⎛
⎝
√
 j sbh
2λ
√
1
s j
− 

⎞
⎠
+
502
+
∑F
i=1 pi q jζ K sbh
(√
 jsbh
2λ
√
1
s j − 
)+

(√
 jsbh
2λ
√
1
s j − 
)+
+ 
503
=
V∑
j=1
ξi

(
−λs j +
(√
sbh − s
bh
√
sbh
)
√
 jλs j +  j sbh
)
504
=
V∑
j=1
ξi

(
−λs j +  j sbh
)
, (19)505
where ξ j is the indicator function, with ξ j = 1 if s j <  j s
bh
λ506
and ξ j = 0 otherwise. Upon defining the binary vector ξ 507
[ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξV ], we can rewrite Problem 1 as follows.508
Problem 3: Given the optimal solutions τ v , ∀v, gleaned509
from the followers, we can rewrite Problem 1 as510
min
ξ , s	0
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(
λs j −  j sbh
)
,511
s.t.
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
 j sbh
λs j
− 
)
≤ . (20)512
Observe from Eq. (20) that Problem 3 is non-convex due513
to ξ . However, for a given ξ , this problem can be solved by514
satisfying the KKT conditions. In the following, we commence515
with the assumption that ξ = 1, i.e., ξv = 1, ∀v, and then we516
extend this result to the general case.517
A. Special Case: ξv = 1, ∀v 518
In this case, all the VRs are participating in the game, and 519
we have the following optimization problem. 520
Problem 4: Assuming ξv = 1, ∀v, we rewrite Problem 3 as 521
min
s	0
V∑
j=1
s j , 522
s.t.
V∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ (V + )
√
λ
sbh
. (21) 523
The optimal solution of Problem 4 is derived and given in 524
the following lemma. 525
Lemma 2: The optimal solution to Problem 4 can be 526
derived as sˆ  [sˆ1, · · · , sˆV ], where 527
sˆv =
sbh
(∑V
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ(V  + )2 , ∀v. (22) 528
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.  529
Note that the solution given in Lemma 2 is found under 530
the assumption that ξv = 1, ∀v. That is, sˆv given in Eq. (22) 531
should ensure that τ v > 0, ∀v, in Eq. (18), i.e., 532
sbh
(∑V
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ(V  + )2 <
vs
bh
λ
. (23) 533
Given the definitions of v , , and , it is interesting to find 534
that the inequality (23) can be finally converted to a constraint 535
on the storage size Q of each SBS, which is formulated as 536
Q > max
⎧
⎨
⎩
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qv − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , ∀v
⎫
⎬
⎭
. (24) 537
The constraint imposed on Q can be expressed in a concise 538
manner in the following theorem. 539
Theorem 2: To make sure that sˆv in Eq. (22) does become 540
the optimal solution of Problem 4 when ξv = 1, ∀v, the 541
sufficient and necessary condition to be satisfied is 542
Q > Qmin 
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qV − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , (25) 543
where qV is the minimum value in q according to Eq. (5). 544
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.  545
Remark 2: Observe from Eq. (25) that since q jqV increases 546
exponentially with γ according to Eq. (5), the value of Qmin 547
ensuring ξv = 1, ∀v, will increase exponentially with γ /3. 548
Note that we have Q ≤ N . In the case that Qmin in Eq. (25) 549
is larger than N for a high VR popularity exponent γ , some 550
VRs with the least popularity will be excluded from the game. 551
B. Further Discussion on Q 552
We define a series of variables Uv , ∀v, as follows: 553
Uv 
NC(δ, α)
(∑v
j=1 3
√
q j
qv − v
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , (26) 554
and formulate the following lemma. 555
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Lemma 3: Uv is a strictly monotonically-increasing func-556
tion of v, i.e., we have UV > UV−1 > · · · > U1.557
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. 558
For the special case of the previous subsection, the optimal559
solution for ξv = 1, ∀v, is found under the condition that the560
storage size obeys Q > UV . In other words, Q should be561
large enough such that every VR can participate in the game.562
However, when Q reduces, some VRs have to leave the game563
as a result of the increased competition. Then we have the564
following lemma.565
Lemma 4: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, the NSP can only retain566
at most the v VRs of V1, V2, · · · , Vv in the game for achieving567
its optimal solution.568
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E. 569
From Lemma 4, when we have Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, and given570
that there are u VRs, u ≤ v, in the game, we can have an571
optimal solution for s.572
Problem 5: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1 is satisfied, and given573
that there are u, u ≤ v, VRs in the game, we can formulate574
the following optimization problem as575
min
s	0
u∑
j=1
s j ,576
s.t.
u∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ (u + )
√
λ
sbh
. (27)577
Similar to the solution of Problem 4, we arrive at578
the optimal solution for the above problem as sˆu 579
[sˆ1,u, · · · , sˆi,u , · · · , sˆV ,u], where580
sˆi,u =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑u
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√i
λ(u + )2 , i = 1, · · · , u,
∞, i = u + 1, · · · , V .
581
(28)582
C. General Case583
Let us now focus our attention on the general solution of584
the original optimization problem, i.e., of Problem 3. Without585
loss of generality, we consider the case of Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1.586
Then Problem 3 is equivalent to the following problem.587
Problem 6: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, there are at most v588
VRs in the game. Then Problem 3 can be converted to589
min
ξ , s	0
v∑
j=1
ξ j
(
λs j −  j sbh
)
,590
s.t.
v∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
 j sbh
λs j
− 
)
≤ . (29)591
The problem in Eq. (29) is again non-convex due to the592
uncertainty of ξu , u = 1, · · · , v. We have to consider the593
cases, where there are u, ∀u, most popular VRs in the594
game. We observe that for a given u, Problem 6 converts595
to Problem 5. Therefore, to solve Problem 6, we first solve596
Problem 5 with a given u and obtain sˆu according to Eq. (28).597
TABLE I
THE CENTRALIZED ALGORITHM AT THE NSP FOR
OBTAINING THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION S
Then we choose the optimal solution, denoted by sv , among 598
sˆ1, · · · , sˆv as the solution to Problem 6, which is formulated as 599
sv 600
= arg min
sˆu
⎧
⎨
⎩
min
⎛
⎝
u∑
j=1
(
λs j −  j sbh
)
⎞
⎠ , u = 1, · · · , v
⎫
⎬
⎭
. 601
(30) 602
Based on the above discussions, we can see that the optimal 603
solution s of Problem 3 is a piece-wise function of Q, i.e., 604
s = sv when Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1. Now, we formulate the 605
solution s = [s1, · · · , sV ] to Problem 3 in a general manner 606
as follows. 607
sv =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑uˆ
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ(uˆ + )2 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ,
∞, v = uˆ + 1, · · · , V ,
608
(31) 609
where regarding uˆ, we have 610
uˆ = arg min
u
{Su : u = 1, 2, · · · , T }, (32) 611
with Su formulated as 612
Su =
u∑
j1=1
⎛
⎜
⎝
2sbh
(∑u
j2=1
3
√
 j2
)2
3
√
 j1
(u + )2 −  j1s
bh
⎞
⎟
⎠, 613
T =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, U1 < Q ≤ U2,
· · · ,
v, Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1,
· · · ,
V , UV < Q.
(33) 614
To gain a better understanding of the optimal solution in 615
Eq. (31), we propose a centralized algorithm at L in Table I 616
for obtaining s. 617
Remark 3: The optimal solution s in Eq. (31), combined 618
with the solution of τ  given by Eq. (18) in Lemma 1, 619
constitutes the SE for the Stackelberg game. 620
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Furthermore, by substituting the optimal s into the expres-621
sion of SN S P in Eq. (19), we get622
SN S P (s, τ )623
= 1

uˆ∑
j1=1
⎛
⎜
⎝ j1s
bh −
2sbh
(∑uˆ
j2=1
3
√
 j2
)2
3
√
 j1
(uˆ + )2
⎞
⎟
⎠.624
(34)625
Remark 4: Since we have v ∝ qv , ∀v, and qv increases626
exponentially with the VR preference parameter γ according627
to Eq. (5), SN S P (s, τ ) also increases exponentially with γ .628
VI. DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER SCHEMES629
Let us now consider two other schemes, namely, an uniform630
pricing scheme and a global optimization scheme.631
A. Uniform Pricing Scheme632
In contrast to the non-uniform pricing scheme of the previ-633
ous section, the uniform pricing scheme deliberately imposes634
the same price on the VRs in the game. We denote the fixed635
price by s. In this case, similar to Lemma 1, Problem 2 can636
be solved by637
τ v =
⎛
⎝
√
vsbh
2λ
√
1
s
− 

⎞
⎠
+
. (35)638
We first focus our attention on the special case of639
ξv = 1, ∀v. Then Problem 4 can be converted to that of640
minimizing s subject to the constraint ∑Vj=1
√
 j
s
≤ (V +641
)
√
λ
sbh
. We then obtain the optimal sˆ for this special case as642
sˆ =
sbh
(∑V
j=1
√
 j
)2
λ(V  + )2 . (36)643
To guarantee that all the VRs are capable of participating in644
the game, i.e., ξv = 1, ∀v, with the optimal price sˆ, we let645
sˆ < v s
bh
λ . Then we have the following constraint on the646
storage Q as647
Q > Q′min 
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1
√
q j
qV − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 . (37)648
We can see that the we require a larger storage size Q649
in Eq. (37) than that in Eq. (25) under the non-uniform650
pricing scheme to accommodate all the VRs, since we have651
∑V
j=1
√
q j
qV >
∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qV . Following Remark 2, we conclude652
that Q′min of the uniform pricing scheme will increase expo-653
nentially with γ /2.654
Then based on this special case, the optimal s =655
[s1, · · · , sV ] in the uniform pricing scheme can be readily656
obtained by following a similar method to that in the previous657
section. That is,658
sv =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑uˆ
j=1
√
 j
)2
λ(uˆ + )2 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ,
∞, v = uˆ + 1, · · · , V ,
(38)659
where regarding uˆ, we have 660
uˆ = arg min
u
{Su : u = 1, 2, · · · , T }, (39) 661
with 662
Su =
u2sbh
(∑u
j=1
√
 j
)2
(u + )2 −
u∑
j=1
 j sbh, 663
T =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, U¯1 < Q ≤ U¯2,
· · · ,
v, U¯v < Q ≤ U¯v+1,
· · · ,
V , U¯V < Q.
(40) 664
Note that U¯v in Eq. (40) is defined as 665
U¯v 
NC(δ, α)
(∑v
j=1
√
q j
qv − v
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 . (41) 666
It is clear that the uniform pricing scheme is inferior to the 667
non-uniform pricing scheme in terms of maximizing SN S P . 668
However, we will show in the following problem that the uni- 669
form pricing scheme offers the optimal solution to maximizing 670
the back-haul cost reduction SB H at the NSP in conjunction 671
with τ v , ∀v, from the followers. 672
Problem 7: With the aid of the optimal solutions τ v , ∀v, 673
from the followers, the maximization on SB H is achieved by 674
solving the following problem: 675
min
ξ , s	0
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
sbh
√
 j λ
√
s j −  j sbh
)
, 676
s.t.
V∑
j=1
ξ j
(√
 j sbh
λs j
− 
)
≤ . (42) 677
The optimal solution to Problem 7 can be readily shown 678
to be s given in Eq. (38). This proof follows the similar 679
procedure of the optimization method presented in the pre- 680
vious section. Thus it is skipped for brevity. In this sense, 681
the uniform pricing scheme is superior to the non-uniform 682
scheme in terms of reducing more cost on back-haul channel 683
transmissions. 684
B. Global Optimization Scheme 685
In the global optimization scheme, we are interested in the 686
sum profit of the NSP and VRs, which can be expressed as 687
SG L B = SN S P +
V∑
j=1
SV Rj 688
=
V∑
j1=1
F∑
j2=1
2 p j2q j1ζ K sbhτ j1
(A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1)τ j1 + C(δ, α)F
689
= 2SB H . (43) 690
Observe from Eq. (43), we can see that the sum profit SG L B is 691
twice the back-haul cost reduction SB H , where the vector τ is 692
the only variable of this maximization problem. 693
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Problem 8: The optimization of the sum profit SG L B can694
be formulated as695
max
τ	0
V∑
j1=1
τ j1
∑F
j2=1 p j2q j1ζ K s
bh
(A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1)τ j1 + C(δ, α)F
,696
s.t.
V∑
j=1
τ j ≤ 1. (44)697
Problem 8 is a typical water-filling optimization problem.698
By relying on the classic Lagrangian multiplier, we arrive at699
the optimal solution as700
τˆv =
⎛
⎝
√qv
η − C(δ, α)F
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1
⎞
⎠
+
, ∀v, (45)701
where we have η =
∑v¯
j=1
√q j
v¯C(δ,α)F+A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1, and v¯ satisfies702
the constraint of τˆv > 0.703
C. Comparisons704
Let us now compare the optimal SBS allocation variable τv705
in the context of the above two schemes. First, we investigate706
τ v in the uniform pricing scheme. By substituting Eq. (38)707
into Eq. (35), we have708
τ v =
⎛
⎝
√
vsbh
2λ
√
1
sv
− 

⎞
⎠
+
709
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
√qv
η′ − C(δ, α)F
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ
0, v = uˆ + 1, · · · , V ,
(46)710
where η′ =
∑uˆ
j=1
√q j
uˆC(δ,α)F+A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1, and uˆ ensures τ

v > 0.711
Then, comparing τ v given in Eq. (46) to the optimal712
solution τˆ of the global optimization scheme given by Eq. (45),713
we can see that these two solutions are the same. In other714
words, the uniform pricing scheme in fact represents the global715
optimization scheme in terms of maximizing the sum profit716
SG L B and maximizing the back-haul cost reduction SB H .717
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS718
In this section, we provide both numerical as well as719
Monte-Carlo simulation results for evaluating the performance720
of the proposed schemes. The physical layer parameters of721
our simulations, such as the path-loss exponent α, transmit722
power P of the SBSs and the noise power σ 2 are similar to723
those of the 3GPP standards. The unit of noise power and724
transmit power is Watt, while the SBS and MU intensities are725
expressed in terms of the numbers of the nodes per square726
kilometer.727
Explicitly, we set the path-loss exponent to α = 4, the728
SBS transmit power to P = 2 Watt, the noise power to729
σ 2 = 10−10 Watt, and the pre-set SINR threshold to δ = 0.01.730
For the file caching system, we set the number of files in731
F to N = 500 and set the number of VRs to V = 15.732
For the network deployments, we set the intensity of the733
Fig. 2. Comparisons between the simulations and analytical results on
Pr(Ev, f ). We consider four kinds of storage size Q in each SBS, i.e.,
Q = 10, 50, 100, 500, and three kinds of SBS intensity, i.e., λ = 10, 20, 30.
MUs to ζ = 50/km2, and investigate three cases of the SBS 734
deployments as λ = 10/km2, 20/km2 and 30/km2. 735
For the pricing system, the profit/U AP is considered to 736
be the profit gained per month within an area of one square 737
kilometer, i.e., /month · km2. We note that the profits gained 738
by the NSP and by the VRs are proportional to the cost sbh of 739
back-haul channels for transmitting a video. Hence, without 740
loss of generality, we set sbh = 1 for simplicity. Additionally, 741
we set K = 10/month, which is the average number of video 742
requests from an MU per month. 743
We first verify our derivation of Pr(Ev, f ) by comparing the 744
analytical results of Theorem 1 to the Monte-Carlo simulation 745
results. Upon verifying Pr(Ev, f ), we will investigate the 746
optimization results within the framework of the proposed 747
Stackelberg game by providing numerical results. 748
A. Performance Evaluation on Pr (Ev, f ) 749
For the Monte-Carlo simulations of this subsection, all the 750
average performances are evaluated over a thousand network 751
scenarios, where the distributions of the SBSs and the MUs 752
change from case to case according the PPPs characterized by 753
 and  , respectively. 754
Note that Pr(Ev, f ) in Theorem 1 is the probability that an 755
MU can obtain its requested video directly from the memory 756
of an SBS rented by Vv . We can see from the expression of 757
Pr(Ev, f ) in Eq. (7) that it is a function of the fraction τv 758
of the SBSs that are rented by Vv . Although τv should be 759
optimized according to the price charged by the NSP, here 760
we investigate a variety of τv values, varying from 0 to 1, to 761
verify the derivation of Pr(Ev, f ). 762
Fig. 2 shows our comparisons between the simulations 763
and analytical results on Pr(Ev, f ). We consider four different 764
storage sizes Q in each SBS by setting Q = 10, 50, 100, 500. 765
Correspondingly, we have four values for the number of file 766
groups, i.e., F = 50, 10, 5, 1. Furthermore, we consider the 767
SBS intensities of λ = 10, 20, 30. From Fig. 2, we can 768
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Fig. 3. The minimum number of Q that allows all the VRs to participate
in the game under different preference parameter γ . In the case that the
minimum Q is larger than N , it means that some VRs will be inevitable
excluded from the game.
see that the simulations results closely match the analytical769
results derived in Theorem 1. Our simulations show that the770
intensity λ does not affect Pr(Ev, f ), which is consistent with771
our analytical results. Furthermore, a larger Q leads to a higher772
value of Pr(Ev, f ). Hence, enlarging the storage size is helpful773
for achieving a higher probability of direct downloading.774
B. Impact of the VR Preference Parameter γ775
The preference distribution q of the VRs defined in Eq. (5)776
is an important factor in predetermining the system perfor-777
mance. Indeed, we can see from Eq. (5) that this distribution778
depends on the parameter γ . Generally, we have 0 < γ ≤ 1,779
with a larger γ representing a more uneven popularity among780
the VRs. First, we find the minimum Q that can keep all781
the VRs in the game. This minimum Q for the non-uniform782
pricing scheme (NUPS) is given by Eq. (25), while the783
minimum Q for the uniform-pricing scheme (UPS) is given by784
Eq. (37). From the two equations, this minimum Q increases785
exponentially with γ /3 in the NUPS, while it also increases786
exponentially with a higher exponent of γ /2 in the UPS.787
Fig. 3 shows this minimum Q for different values of the788
VR preference parameter γ .789
We can see that the UPS needs a larger Q than the NUPS790
for keeping all the VRs. This gap increases rapidly with the791
growth of γ . For example, for γ = 0.3, the uniform pricing792
scheme requires almost 80 more storages, while for γ = 0.6,793
it needs 200 more. We can also observe in Fig. 3 that for794
γ > 0.66 in the UPS and for γ > 0.98 in the NUPS,795
the minimum Q becomes larger than the overall number of796
videos N . In both cases, since we have Q ≤ N (Q > N797
results in the same performance as Q = N), some unpopular798
VRs will be excluded from the game.799
Next, we study the number of VR participants that stay in800
the game for the two schemes upon increasing γ . We can see801
from Fig. 4 that the number of VR participants keeps going802
down upon increasing γ in the both schemes. The NUPS803
Fig. 4. Number of participants, i.e., the VRs that are in the game, vs.
the preference parameter γ , under the two schemes. We also consider four
different values of the storage size Q, i.e., 10, 50, 100, 500.
Fig. 5. Various revenues, including S N S P and SG L B , vs. the preference
parameter γ , under the two schemes.
always keeps more VRs in the game than the UPS under 804
the same γ . At the same time, by considering Q = 805
10, 50, 100, 500, it is shown that for a given γ , a higher Q 806
will keep more VRs in the game. 807
Fig. 5 shows two kinds of revenues gained by the two 808
schemes for a given storage of Q = 500, namely, the global 809
profit SG L B defined in Eq. (43) and the profit of the NSP 810
SN S P defined in Eq. (9). Recall that we have SG L B = 2SB H 811
according to Eq. (43). We can see that the revenues of both 812
schemes increase exponentially upon increasing γ , as stated 813
in Remark 4. As our analytical result shows, the profit SN S P 814
gained by the NUPS is optimal and thus it is higher than 815
that gained by the UPS, while the UPS maximizes both 816
SG L B and SB H . Fig. 5 verifies the accuracy of our derivations. 817
C. Impact of the Storage Size Q 818
Since γ is a network parameter that is relatively fixed, 819
the NSP can adapt the storage size Q for controlling 820
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Fig. 6. Number of participants vs. the storage size Q, under the two schemes.
We also consider two different values of γ , i.e., γ = 0.3, 1.
Fig. 7. Various revenues, including S N S P and SG L B , vs. the storage size Q,
under the two schemes.
its performance. In this subsection, we investigate the per-821
formance as a function of Q. Fig. 6 shows the number of822
participants in the game versus Q, where γ = 0.3 and 1 are823
considered. It is shown that for a larger Q, more VRs are able824
to participate in the game. Again, the NUPS outperforms the825
UPS owing to its capability of accommodating more VRs for826
a given Q. By comparing the scenarios of γ = 0.3 and 1, we827
find that for γ = 0.3, a given increase of Q can accommodate828
more VRs in the game than γ = 1.829
Fig. 7 shows both SN S P and SG L B versus Q for the two830
schemes for a given γ = 1. We can see that the revenues of831
both schemes increase with the growth of Q. It is shown that832
the profit SN S P gained by the NUPS is higher than the one833
gained by the UPS, while the UPS outperforms the NUPS in834
terms of both SG L B and SB H .835
D. Individual VR Performance836
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of each837
individual VR, including the price charged to them for renting838
Fig. 8. Price charged on each VR for renting an SBS per month.
Fig. 9. The fraction of SBSs that are rented by each VR.
an SBS per month, and the fractions of the SBSs they rent 839
from the NSP. We fix γ = 0.5 and choose a large storage size 840
of Q = 500 for ensuring that all the VRs can be included. 841
Fig. 8 shows the price charged to each VR for renting an 842
SBS. The VRs are arranged according to their popularity 843
order, ranging from V1 to V15, with V1 having the highest 844
popularity and V15 the lowest one. We can see from the figure 845
that in the NUPS, the price for renting an SBS is higher for 846
the VRs having a higher popularity than those with a lower 847
popularity. By contrast, in the UPS, this price is fixed for all 848
the VRs. Fig. 9 shows the specific fraction of the rented SBSs 849
at each VR. In both schemes, the VRs associated with a high 850
popularity tend to rent more SBSs. The UPS in fact represents 851
an instance of the water-filling algorithm. Furthermore, the 852
UPS seems more aggressive than the NUPS, since the less 853
popular VRs of the UPS are more difficult to rent an SBS, 854
and thus these VRs are likely to be excluded from the game 855
with a higher probability. 856
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 857
In this paper, we considered a commercial small-cell 858
caching system consisting of an NSP and multiple VRs, where 859
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the NSP leases its SBSs to the VRs for gaining profits and for860
reducing the costs of back-haul channel transmissions, while861
the VRs, after storing popular videos to the rented SBSs, can862
provide faster transmissions to the MUs, hence gaining more863
profits. We proposed a Stackelberg game theoretic framework864
by viewing the SBSs as a type of resources. We first modeled865
the MUs and SBSs using two independent PPPs with the aid of866
stochastic geometry, and developed the probability expression867
of direct downloading. Then, based on the probability derived,868
we formulated a Stackelberg game for maximizing the average869
profit of the NSP as well as individual VRs. Next, we investi-870
gate the Stackelberg equilibrium by solving the associated non-871
convex optimization problem. We considered a non-uniform872
pricing scheme and an uniform pricing scheme. In the former873
scheme, the prices charged to each VR for renting an SBS874
are different, while the latter imposes the same price for875
each VR. We proved that the non-uniform pricing scheme876
can effectively maximize the profit of the NSP, while the877
uniform one maximizes the sum profit of the NSP and the VRs.878
Furthermore, we derived a relationship between the optimal879
pricing of renting an SBS, the fraction of SBSs rented by each880
VR, the storage size of each SBS and the popularity of the881
VRs. We verified by Monte-Carlo simulations that the direct882
downloading probability under our PPP model is consistent883
with our derived results. Then we provided several numerical884
results for showing that the proposed schemes are effective in885
both pricing and SBSs allocation.886
APPENDIX A887
PROOF OF THEOREM 1888
Recall that the SBSs allocated to the VR Vv and cache G f889
are modeled as a “thinned” HPPP v, f having the intensity890
of 1F τvλ. We consider a typical MU M who wishes to connect891
to the nearest SBS B in v, f . The event Ev, f represents that892
this SBS can support M with an SINR no lower than δ, and893
thus M can obtain the desired file from the cache of B.894
We carry out the analysis on Pr(Ev, f ) for the typical MU895
M located at the origin. Since the network is interference896
dominant, we neglect the noise in the following. We denote by897
z the distance between M and B, by xZ the location of B, and898
by ρ(xZ ) the received SINR at M from B. Then the average899
probability that M can download the desired video from B is900
Pr(ρ(xZ ) ≥ δ)901
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
⎛
⎜
⎝
hxZ z−α∑
x∈\{xZ }
hx ‖x‖−α ≥ δ
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
z
⎞
⎟
⎠ fZ (z) dz902
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
hxZ ≥
δ
(
∑
x∈\{xZ }
hx ‖x‖−α
)
z−α
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
z
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
903
2π
1
F
τvλz exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz904
=
∫ ∞
0
EI
(
exp
(−zαδ I )) 2π 1
F
τvλz exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz,905
(47)906
where we have I 
∑
x∈\{xZ }
hx ‖x‖−α , and the PDF of z, i.e., 907
fZ (z), is derived by the null probability of the HPPP v, f 908
with the intensity of 1F τvλ. More specifically in v, f , since 909
the number of the SBSs k in an area of A follows the Poisson 910
distribution, the probability of the event that there is no SBS 911
in the area with the radius of z can be calculated as [17] 912
Pr(k = 0 | A = πz2) = e−A 1F τvλ (A
1
F τvλ)
k
k! = e
−πz2 1F τvλ. 913
(48) 914
By using the above expression, we arrive at fZ (z) = 915
2π 1F τvλz exp
(−π 1F τvλz2
)
. Note that the interference I con- 916
sists of I1 and I2, where I1 emanates from the SBSs in  917
excluding v, f , while I2 is from the SBSs in v, f excluding 918
B. The SBSs contributing to I1, denoted by v, f , have the 919
intensity of
(
1 − 1F τv
)
λ, while those contributing to I2 have 920
the intensity of 1F τvλ. 921
Correspondingly, the calculation of EI (exp (−zαδ I )) will 922
be split into the product of two expectations over I1 and I2. 923
The expectation over I1 is calculated as 924
EI1
(
exp
(−zαδ I1
))
925
(a)= Ev, f
⎛
⎝
∏
x∈v
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−zαδhx ‖x‖−α
)
exp(−hx)dhx
⎞
⎠ 926
(b)= exp
(
−
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λ
∫
R2
(
1 − 1
1 + zαδ ‖xk‖−α
)
dxk
)
927
= exp
(
−2π
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λ
1
α
z2δ
2
α B
(
2
α
, 1 − 2
α
))
, 928
= exp
(
−π
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λC(δ, α)z2
)
, (49) 929
where (a) is based on the independence of chan- 930
nel fading, while (b) follows from E
(
∏
x
u (x)
)
= 931
exp
(−λ ∫
R2 (1 − u (x)) dx
)
, where x ∈  and  is an PPP in 932
R
2 with the intensity λ [24], and C(δ, α) has been defined as 933
2
α δ
2
α B
( 2
α , 1 − 2α
)
. 934
The expectation over I2 has to take into account z as the 935
distance from the nearest interfering SBS. Then we have 936
EI2
(
exp(−zαδ I2)
)
937
= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλ2π
∫ ∞
z
(
1 − 1
1 + zαδr−α
)
rdr
)
938
(a)= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλπδ
2
α z2
2
α
∫ ∞
δ−1
κ
2
α −1
1 + κ dx
)
939
(b)= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλπδz
2 2
α − 2 2 F1
(
1, 1 − 2
α
; 2 − 2
α
; −δ
))
, 940
(50) 941
where (a) defines κ  δ−1z−αrα , and 2 F1(·) 942
in (b) is the hypergeometric function. As we 943
defined A(δ, α) = 2δα−2 2 F1
(
1, 1 − 2α ; 2 − 2α ; −δ
)
, by 944
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substituting (49) and (50) into (47), we have945
Pr(ρ(xZ ) ≥ δ)946
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−π
(
1 − 1
F
τv
)
λC(δ, α)z2
)
947
exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2A(δ, α)
)
2π
1
F
τvλz exp
(
−π 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz948
=
1
F τv
C(δ, α)(1 − 1F τv) + A(δ, α) 1F τv + 1F τv
. (51)949
This completes the proof. 950
APPENDIX B951
PROOF OF LEMMA 2952
By applying Lagrangian multipliers to the objective func-953
tion, we have954
L(s, μ, ν)955
=
V∑
j=1
s j + μ
⎛
⎝
V∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
− (V  + )
√
λ
sbh
⎞
⎠ −
V∑
j=1
ν j s j ,956
(52)957
where μ and ν j are non-negative multipliers associated with958
the constraints
∑V
j=1
√
 j
s j −(V+)
√
λ
sbh
≤ 0 and s j ≥ 0,959
respectively. Then the KKT conditions can be written as960
∂L(s, μ, ν)
∂s j
= 0, ∀ j = 1, · · · , V ,961
μ
⎛
⎝
V∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
−(V+)
√
λ
sbh
⎞
⎠ = 0, and ν j s j = 0, ∀ j.962
(53)963
From the first line of Eq. (53), we have964
s j = 3
√
μ2 j
4(1 − ν j )2 . (54)965
Obviously, we have s j = 0, ∀ j , otherwise the constraint966
∑V
j=1
√
 j
s j − (V  + )
√
λ
sbh
≤ 0 cannot be satisfied.967
Thus, we have ν j = 0, ∀ j . Furthermore, we have μ = 0968
according to Eq. (54) since s j is non-zero. This means that969
∑V
j=1
√
 j
s j − (V + )
√
λ
sbh
= 0.970
By substituting Eq. (54) into this constraint, we have971
3√μ =
√
sbh
∑V
j=1 3
√
2 j√
λ(V  + ) . (55)972
Then it follows that973
s j =
sbh
(∑V
v=1 3
√
v
)2
3
√
 j
λ(V  + )2 . (56)974
This completes the proof. 975
APPENDIX C 976
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 977
As discussed in Eq. (23) and Eq. (24), we have proved that 978
Q > NC(δ,α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√ q j
qV
−V
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 is a sufficient condition for the 979
optimal solution in Eq. (22). In other words, as long as Q is 980
satisfied, we have the conclusion that the solution in Eq. (22) 981
is optimal and ξv = 1, ∀v. 982
Next, we prove the necessary aspect. Without loss of 983
generality, we assume that 984
NC(δ, α)
(∑V−1
j=1 3
√
q j
qV −1 − V + 1
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 < Q 985
≤
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√
q j
qV − V
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 . (57) 986
This leads to sV ≥ v sbhλ , and the VR VV will be excluded 987
from the game. In this case, we have ξ j = 1, j = 1, · · · , V −1, 988
and Problem 4 will be rewritten as follows. 989
Problem 9: We rewrite Problem 4 as 990
min
s	0
V−1∑
j=1
s j , 991
s.t.
V−1∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ ((V − 1) + )
√
λ
sbh
. (58) 992
Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, and combined with the 993
constraint of Q in Eq. (57), the optimal solution of Problem 9 994
is given by 995
sˆv =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sbh
(∑V−1
j=1 3
√
 j
)2
3√v
λ((V − 1) + )2 , v = 1, · · · , V − 1,
∞, v = V .
996
(59) 997
We can see that the optimal solution given in Eq. (59) 998
contradicts to the optimal solution of Problem 4 given in 999
Eq. (22). Hence, Q > NC(δ,α)
(∑V
j=1 3
√ q j
qV
−V
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 is a necessary 1000
condition for finding the optimal solution in Eq. (22). This 1001
completes the proof.  1002
APPENDIX D 1003
PROOF OF LEMMA 3 1004
Consider v1, v2 = 1, · · · , V and v1 = v2 + 1. Then we 1005
prove that Uv1 > Uv2 . We have 1006
Uv1 =
NC(δ, α)
(∑v1
j=1 3
√ q j
qv1
− v1
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 1007
=
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1 3
√ q j
qv1
−v2+∑v1j=v2+1 3
√ q j
qv1
−(v1−v2)
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 1008
=
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1 3
√ q j
qv1
−v2
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 1009
(a)
>
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1 3
√ q j
qv2
− v2
)
A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1 = Uv2, (60) 1010
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where (a) comes from the fact that qv1 < qv2 . This completes1011
the proof. 1012
APPENDIX E1013
PROOF OF LEMMA 41014
It is plausible that if L can only keep at most v VRs, it has1015
to retain the v most popular VRs to maximize its profit. Let1016
us now prove that if L keeps (v +w) VRs, w = 1, · · · , V −v,1017
in the game, it cannot achieve the optimal solution for1018
Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1.1019
Problem 10: In the case that L keeps (v+w) VRs, we have1020
the optimization problem of1021
min
s	0
v+w∑
j=1
s j ,1022
s.t.
v+w∑
j=1
√
 j
s j
≤ ((v + w) + )
√
λ
sbh
. (61)1023
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain that Q >1024
NC(δ,α)
(∑v+w
j=1 3
√ q j
qv+w −(v+w)
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 = Uv+w is the necessary con-1025
dition for the (v + w) VRs to participate in the game. This1026
contradicts to the premise Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, since we have1027
Q > Uv+1 according to Lemma 3. Let us now consider1028
the cases of w′ = 0,−1, · · · , 1 − v. To ensure there are1029
(v + w′) VRs in the game, Q has to satisfy the condition1030
that Q > Uv+w′ . Since Q > Uv ≥ Uv+w′ , this implies that1031
given (v + w′) VRs in the game, the NSP can achieve an1032
optimal solution. This completes the proof. 1033
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